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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The

financial services industry has experienced significant transformations, both

internationally and domestically.

As

part of the financial industry, the

banking business

has expanded rapidly, due to technology innovations, financial product diversification,

and economic development. The rapid development of new financial products and the
complexity of financial markets make

it

banking business from investment banking

impossible to clearly distinguish traditional
activities.

Moreover, during the

decades, international banking activities have increased substantially.

last several

1

International trade

and the availability of technology make possible and necessary to diversify banks'
financial businesses, including securities business.
in

As

a result, bank securities activities

both domestic and international markets have become an important part of banking

activity diversification.

To prevent excessive
safety

risks associated with

nonbank

activities

from impairing

and soundness of banking system, the previous regulatory regime

States limited the banking business to deposit taking

in the

United

and commercial lending. The

separation of traditional banking from the investment banking business has, to

some

degree, helped the United States financial system survive the economic depression in

1930s. However, the economic landscape has changed substantially since the great
depression.

As

become outmoded,

a result, the depression-era regulations have

since the

separation of commercial banking from investment banking has impaired the ability of

U.S. banking organizations to survive in the

new

financial

environment and meet the

expanded demands of customers. Accordingly, there have been strenuous

See Edward

L.

Symons, The United

States

Banking System, 19 Brook.

J. Int'l

L.

1,

1

efforts to repeal

(1993).

the Glass-Steagall Act,

Compared
more

to U.S.

which put too many

activity restrictions

banking regulations, the regulatory regime

on commercial banks.

in the

European Union

is

implementation of the Second Banking Directive, which

liberal, especially after the

allows E.U. credit institutions to engage in both traditional banking and investment

banking businesses, and even some non-financial industries.
In order to effectively compete with non-banking institutions and foreign banks,

who have

successfully invaded in traditional banking markets, U.S. banks and bank

holding companies have

made

strenuous efforts to enter into the securities business.

However, these endeavors were
stringent restrictions.

law

that U.S.

services,

It

was not

far

from smooth and

until the Financial Service

banking organizations are finally free

which

are compatible to

to

because of previous

effortless,

Act of 1999 was signed

provide a

full

into

range of financial

what European Union's universal banks have provided.

Deregulation has become an inevitable trend in the modernization of the financial
industry.

With

organizations,

the

it

is

growing importance of

and investment

activities to

banking

increasingly important to develop appropriate regulatory framework

for the financial industry.

financial

securities

Although the tendency of liberalization and deregulation

industry will enhance the efficiency, profitability,

international banks, there

is still

in the

and competitiveness of

a need for meaningful legislation to protect the safety

and soundness of the modernized financial system.
This thesis
activities in the

analyzes

the

United States and

previous
its

regulatory

effects

in the current

Chapter

II

movement of financial

to

bank investment

on banking industry, discusses regulatory

changes that expanded banking powers, reviews the

problems

approach

new

legislation

reform, and suggests

some

and potential

solutions.

reviews previous statutory regimes on bank securities

activities,

including those separating traditional and investment banking under Glass-Steagall Act

and Bank Holding

Company

Act.

The regulatory regime under E.U. banking system

is

addressed to give an example of successful deregulation, by which universal banks
fully

may

enjoy the rapid changing domestic and international financial markets.

Chapter

analyzes the effects of laws governing bank securities activities. This

III

part expresses concerns that laws separating traditional

banking and securities

have affected the competitiveness and effectiveness of commercial banks
States

and international financial markets. These

effects

activities

in the

United

have largely prompted financial

services reform in the United States.

Chapter IV examines the well-known trend of commercial bank entering into the

To some

securities business.

banking

investment

the

degree, banks have successfully expanded their powers in

areas

through

financial

agency interpretations

and

jurisprudence. This part also addresses the trend of investment bank acquisitions

court

by bank

holding companies, which would become important incentives for Congress to pass
financial reform bills.

Chapter

V

gives an overview of recent legislative reform on financial services,

including extensive modification of the Glass-Steagall Act and

Bank Holding Company

Act, designed to allow banking organizations to conduct a wide range of financial

Financial

services.

services

reform has made a successful march toward financial

modernization in the United States.

Chapter VI addresses some comments on remaining problems associated with
current of financial services reform in the United States. These potential problems include

holding
part

company

also

considered

structure, functional regulation,

addresses

the

issue

of international

critical in crafting the

and consumer protection
supervisory

issues. This

convergence,

which

is

appropriate regulatory regime for the expanded and

diversified international banking.

Chapter VII concludes that because of the growing complexity and interrelation of
the

American

financial system, meaningful legislation should

While the new law has liberalized

activities

be carefully designed.

of banks and bank holding companies,

regulators have to pay attention to the safety and soundness of financial system. This part
also serves to further underscore the

convergence of international supervisions, which are

significantly important to ensure the safe

and sound financial system.

CHAPTER

II

PREVIOUS STATUTORY REGIME ON BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
General Restrictions on Bank Investment Activities under the Glass-Steagall Act

A.

and Bank Holding

Company Act

Generally, the Glass-Steagall Act, part of the Banking Act of 1933, prohibited
U.S. commercial banks, with certain exceptions, from directly underwriting secunties.

There was a widespread concern
involvement

that

in securities activities

commercial banks' and

was responsible

marked by the 1929 stock market collapse and
1930s.

The Glass-Stealgall Act attempted

their affiliates' substantial

for the Great Depression,

3

which was

the subsequent banking crisis of the early

to separate

commercial banking and investment

banking, so as to reduce the potential risks associated with the overlap between the two
usinesses.

4

The Glass-Steagall Act

established limitations

on bank

securities activities,

such as purchasing and selling securities for their customers, and underwriting,

and dealing

in specified securities

from engaging principally
firms

from

Furthermore,

engaging
it

in

by

their

own

accounts.
6

in securities activities.

5

Bank

The Act

commercial banking business,

affiliates

selling,

were prohibited

also prohibited securities

such

as

taking

deposits.

required that individuals involved in any aspect of investment banking
o

business not serve as officers, directors or employees in commercial banks.

2
3

See 12 U.S.C. §§24, 377, 378(a), 78 (1994).

JONNATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P.

(2ed. 1997).
4

Id. at
5

496.

12 U.S.C. §335(1994).

6

Id.
7

§ 377.

Id.

§378(a)(l).

Id.

§78.

8

MILLER.,

BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 495

Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited national banks that are

members from buying

insurance

securities for their

own

account.

9

FD1C

Federal- or state-

chartered banks were expressly proscribed from underwriting and dealing in securities.

member banks and

Section 20 prohibited national banks, state Federal Reserve

with any entity engaged principally in investment banking

subsidiaries

from

businesses,

such as "issuing, flotation, underwriting, public

wholesale or

affiliating

retail

10

or distribution at

Subject to Section 16 exceptions that allow commercial banks to be

involved in selected securities
in

sale,

or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes,

or other securities."

engaging

their

issuing,

activities,

underwriting,

an institution was prohibited by Section 21 from

selling,

or distributing

securities

if

it

received

deposits."

Section 32 precluded
Federal Reserve
1

business.

"

management

member banks and

Officers, directors, and

interlocking and directorial overlap between

institutions

employees

engaged principally

in investment

prohibited from being staffs of commercial banks at the

same

in the securities

banking
13

time.

institutions are

This restriction also

applied to banking and investment entities that have no affiliated relationship.
In order to strengthen the limitations and restrictions

on

14

securities activities of

commercial banks under the Glass-Steagall Act, U.S. Congress enacted the Bank Holding

Company Act of

1956.

15

As

a general rule under the

Bank Holding Company

Act, bank

holding companies were prohibited from acquiring or retaining direct ownership or
control of

any voting shares of any company

Bank Holding Company Act was
9

Id.
10

16

The general purpose of

to protect depository institutions

from

risks associated

§24 (Seventh).

Id.

§377.

Id.

§378.

Id.

§78.

11

that is not a bank.

12

13

Id.

"Id.

See Joseph J. Northern & Christopher D. Lolive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory
and Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Partnership", 16 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 227 (1997).

with nonbanking businesses in other affiliates of bank holding companies, thus ensuring
the safety and soundness of banking system.

The

barriers created

by

the Glass-Steagall Act and

Bank Holding Company Act

between commercial and investment banking were not impenetrable. Exceptions of the

buy and

Glass-Steagall Act did allow national banks to

order of and for the accounts of customers.
their clients. National

bank

itself

banks can purchase and

In this situation,

sell

government

banks act as fiduciaries of
securities, securities

of the

and securities of other national banks.

Bank Holding Companies

Y

17

purely upon the

sell securities

generally have a broader range of powers. Regulation

of the Federal Reserve Board provides a

of permissible non-banking

list

activities that

can be engaged in by bank holding companies, because these activities are closely related
to banking.

1

If a

Regulation Y,

conduct

this

bank holding company wants

it

new

engage

to

in

an activity that

can seek permission from the Federal Reserve Board
20

activity.

permissible activities to the

The Federal Reserve Board has added
from time

list

to

to

not listed in

allow

it

to

a broad range of

time according to applications of bank

holding companies to expand the scope of their businesses. Through
to

is

its

"closely related

banking" interpretations, the Federal Reserve Board has allowed bank holding
7

companies

to

engage

in a rather extensive array

of securities

activities.

1

In addition, the

Courts tend to support Federal Reserve Board's interpretations that greatly expand

banking powers injudicial review.

Bank holding companies
countries could enjoy

more

that

liberal

have subsidiaries or
regulations.

Regulation K, bank holding companies

16

12U.S.C. §1843(a) (1994).

17

Id.

§24.

Id.

§24.

18

19

20
21

Id.§ 1843(c).

MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 356.
See Symons, supra note 1, at 22 (1993).

Under

may engage

affiliates operating in foreign

the Federal Reserve Board's

in underwriting, distributing

and

8

dealing in debt and equity securities subject to less stringent restrictions

doing business outside the United States.

Compared

to previously stringent restrictions

United States, related regulations

are

22

Liberalization of banking regulation in the European

B.

when they

in the

Union

on bank

securities activities in the

European Union are much more

liberal.

major policy difference between the United States and the European Union

is that

The
the

United States has more concern for the safety and soundness of the financial system,
while the European Union pays more attention to harmonization and integration of
financial markets in

European countries. Accordingly, when the United States maintained

an extensive system of stringent banking regulations, the European Union has advocated
the

most

the

European Union reflected the trend of globalization and deregulation of financial

liberal financial

system

in the world. Liberalization

of the regulatory system in

services in the world. In the significantly deregulated framework, E.U. universal banks

can provide a

full

range of financial services, thus significantly improve their competitive

ability in the international markets.

United States to reform
financial

system

is

its

This has become one of the incentives that pushed the

previous banking regulations.

An

overview of the liberalized

necessary to understand the trend of globalization and deregulation of

banking businesses.

Among

the four basic freedoms through

harmonization and integration in

its

which European Union intends

internal market, "free

accessory to the other three basic freedoms,"
persons, and services.

achieve

22
23

E.U.

24

The

financial

liberalization

integration,

23

movement of capital

which are

free

of financial services

characterized

is

24

Id.

GEORGE A. BERMANN

ET AL,

achieve

is

a vital

movements of goods,

an important strategy to

by a single community banking

12C.F.R. §21 1.5(d) (1994).
See

to

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

606 (1993).

market.

25

Under

the single market approach, credit institutions

whole range of

subsidiaries and provide the

without the need for establishment

every

in

their services

may

throughout the
6

Member

"establish branches or

Community

The Treaty of Rome

State".

provides the legal basis for the single banking market to insure the rights to provide
27

financial services.

to

The meaning of free movement of capital should include

the freedom

provide financial services, because practically, "the freedom to provide banking

services

exists

only

in

those

Member

State

that

have

fully

liberalized

capital

movements"."
Since 1962, European Union has endeavored to achieve the liberalization of

movements, which

capital

is

one of the most

In 1977 the Council

difficult tasks."

adopted the First Banking Directive, which "allowed banks based anywhere in the
establish branches or subsidiaries in

banking regulations
Directive

is

in

any other member country on the condition

the host country

were

one of the early steps taken by the

June, 1988, the Council of Ministers of the
transactions, including short-term capital
full liberalization

member

states to integrate

the crucial law in

See George
Int'l L.J.
26

Id. at

S.

fully observed".

EC

EC

to liberalize

authorized

movements.

32
It

it

Directive,

banking

was intended

which was adopted

into their national legislation.

European banking regulation.

The

34

in

to

that

31

activities.

implement the

33

December 1989,

By

it

became

the

Second

January 1993,

The major purpose of

requires

Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 3

1

Harv.

463,464-65(1990).

465.

Id.
Id. at

465,

n. 12.

29

Mat 465.
30
ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
121 (1994).
31

Id.
32
33
34
35

See generally, Council Directive 88/361/EC.
See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra not 30,
See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC.
See

Wendy

Fowler,

EC Regulation

at 120.

of the Banking Sector,

In

of capital

27
28

to

Banking

First

full liberalization

of capital movements by the end of July 1990.

The Second Banking

EC

5 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 405,

410 (1993).

10

Banking Directive

is to

achieve essential harmonization in banking regulation within the

E.U. and to ensure the free

movement of capital.

36

In the single license

under the Second Banking Directive, credit institutions

member

states without host state authorization.

Union

to

is

may open

their

system designed

branches in other

The ultimate objective of the European

achieve monetary integration in the European Union.

Although the Second Banking Directive creates considerable
credit institutions

and non-E.U. banks, the degrees

from the single license system are somewhat

to

profits for both E.U.

which non-E.U. banks can benefit

different.

A

non-E.U. bank can not be

considered as a credit institution under the meaning of the Second Banking directive,

only has a presence in a
this

mere branch of

this

Member

license system, this non-E.U.

40

anywhere

in the

Therefore,

that state.

In order to fully enjoy the benefit

from the single

bank must establish or acquire a subsidiary

to operate as a credit institution

is

it

non-E.U. bank can not operate throughout European Union

without host state authorization.

subsidiary which

by

State without authorization

if

by a member

authorized by a

Member

41

state.

State, the

Once

that is licensed

the non-E.U.

bank has a

bank may operating

its

offices

European Union without going through any other licensing process.

Credit institutions subjected to the Second Banking Directive can conduct a full

range of financial activities including traditional financial activities and various securities
activities,

such as underwriting securities.

Directive, a credit institution can trade for
in "(a)

money market

42

its

Under Annex

own

1

of the Second Banking

account or for account of its customers

instruments; (b) foreign exchange; (c) financial futures and options;

See generally, Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC.
37

Id. Art. 6.

See Craig M. Scheer, The Second Banking Directive and Deposit Insurance
Implications for U.S. Banks, 28 Geo. Wash.

J. Int'l

& Econ.

See Craig M. Scheer, The Second Banking Directive and Deposit Insurance
Implications for U.S. Banks, 28 Geo. Wash.
40
41

42

J. Int'l

& Econ.

171, 177 (1994).

Id. at 176.

Mat

in the

European Union:

in the

European Union:

171, 176 (1994).

177.

See generally, Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Annex.

11

exchange and

(d)

interest rate instruments; (e) transferable securities."

Banking Directive was intended

to

43

The Second

encourage establishment of the universal banking

model, within which traditional banking, investment banking, and even some commercial

and industrial businesses are combined

According

their territories the transaction

45

Member

activities.

member
states

of

bank,

home

its

if the

state, the

home

state

activities listed in the

may impose
6

stricter

However,

which have

of the financial

activities

must permit within

Annex by

a credit institution

host state

may

in

who

47

Germany,

to

German

registered

conduct practically

When

universal banks intend to open their branches or subsidiaries in a

prohibitions. Accordingly,

its

For example, German law permits

Second Banking Directive.

prohibits or limits universal banking, these

has

not put such restrictions on activities of this

their registered offices in

listed

such

standards and limitations on the banks

for a credit institution

allows such activities.

universal banks,

states

state," if the credit institution's authorization covers

registered within their territories.
office in

institution.

Second Banking Directive, "member

to the

authorized in another

one

in

German banks

Member

German

State that

are not subject to the host state

may have

universal banks

these

all

competitive advantages

over the host country's domestic banks. The host country then has the incentive to adjust
its

banking regulations

the

Second

regulations

to

be more consistent with the German law. This

Banking Directive works

among E.U.

to

achieve

the

is

the

way

that

of financial

harmonization

countries.

In E.U. countries, banking regulatory regimes

on bank investment

activities are

quite different. Generally, there are three broad types of regulatory systems: the universal

banking system, the hybrid system and the

43

45

Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Annex §7.
See Zavvos, supra note 25, at 480.
See Fowler, supra note 35, at 412.

46

Id.

See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Art.
48

See Zavvos, supra note 25,

at

481.

6.

strict

regulatory system.

The

universal

12

banking model could be found
can not only take deposits and

in

make

mutual funds,

securities, to operate

Germany, where "corporations with banking

engage

large equity shares in commercial, industrial,
are kept within different departments

countries such as United

and trade

loans, but also are permitted to underwrite

to

in

licenses

investment counseling, and even to hold

and insurance companies

of the bank".

49

if

these activities

The hybrid system can be found

Kingdom France and Greece.

in

banks have a

In this system,

broad range of powers, but they are subject to some statutory limitations on their
investment

activities.

such as securities

For example, British banks tend to conduct non-bank

activities,

within separate legal

Within the

entities.

regulatory framework, such as Italian banking system, banks are subject to
52

restrictions.

In

of these different regulatory systems within

light

achieving the goal of harmonization on banking regulation
a need for

member

states to

is far

from

activities,

restrictive

strict activity

EU

countries,

effortless.

There

implement the Council Directives and cooperate

is

in the

harmonization process.
C.

Summary of differences of U.S. and

E.U. laws

Because of the risky nature of underwriting

securities, the

importance of public

confidence in the banking system, and the special role of banks in national economy, U.S.

banking laws previously prohibited banks and bank holding companies from undertaking
securities

brokerage

activities,

with

some

limited

exemptions.

In

contrast,

E.U.

directives permit credit institutions to engage in investment banking activities, such
securities

underwriting,

different approaches to

49
30
51

2

trading,

bank

investment

advisory

and brokerage

securities activities reflect the different premises

Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking, 19 Brook.
See Zavvos, supra note 25, at 481
Macey, supra note 49. at 203.

See

Uwe

services.

J. Int'l

The

upon which

203, 203 (1993).

H. Schneider, The Harmonization of EC Banking Laws: the Euro-Passport to Profitability and
& Pol'y Int'l Bus. 261, 279 (1991).

International Competitiveness of Financial Institutions, 22 law

See Frederic W. Gerkens, Opportunities for regulatoiy Arbitrage under the European Economic
Community 's Financial Services Directives and Related United States Regulations, 16 N.Y.L. Sch.

& comp.

L. 455,

464-465 (1996).

J.

Int'l
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Community and United

States laws are based.

54

The European Union has

realized that

economic development and technology innovations substantially increase the competition
in the financial service marketplace.

been

Furthermore, the traditional banking business has

investment banking industry. Permitting banks to engage in

less profitable than the

the securities industry protects the safety and soundness of the

by participating

in the

investment banking business, banks become more profitable,

thus enhance their competitive ability.

experience

in

branches or

affiliates.

banking industry, because

distributing
56

In

Europe, banks have had

both domestic and international

securities

companies are not strong enough
57

and

years of

through their

Unlike large securities firms in the United States, E.U. banks play

the major role in the investment banking industry in Europe, because

market."

many

55

to "provide the capital

non-bank

securities

necessary for a modern securities

Accordingly, adoption of the universal banking model

is

more appropriate

in

the European Union, considering the rapid expansion and fierce competition in the
international capital market.

The development of universal banks

will

improve the

CO

competitive position of the European Union on the global marketplace.

The United

States has

now

undertaken

its

own banking law

reform, which will

greatly

expand banking powers. This reform, heightened by the Financial Services Act of

1999,

has

embraced a certain degree of deregulation

liberalization

of financial system

in the

that

is

comparable

to

European Union. More detailed descriptions of

U.S. banking law reform are presented in Chapter V.

54

See Zavvos, supra note 25.

at

481.

55

Id.
56

See

SAMUEL L. HAYES

THREE
57

III

See Zavvos, supra note 25,

58

Id.

& PHILIP

CITIES 65 (1990).
at

481.

M.

the

HUBBARD, INVESTMENT BANKING: A TALE OF

CHAPTER

III

THE EFFECTS OF LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
A.

The Rationale
banking
It

basis for imposing a separation

activities

was believed

between

securities

and commercial

and the defects of this rationale
that the

combination of traditional bank

activities,

such as keeping

deposits and providing credit to consumers, and non-bank activities, such as underwriting
securities, creates inherent conflicts

many

of

59

interest.

There were some arguments

functions concentrated in a single financial institution

provide high quality services in some areas.

encourage

specialized

institutions

multifunctional institutions to offer
industry

was not

to

all

60

According

provide

would reduce

to these opinions,

types

particular

kinds of services.

61
It

of

was believed

its

it

that too

ability to

better to

is

than

services
that if

banking

structured to avoid conflict of interest, public confidence in the banking

system would be undermined.

62

Because of the unique position of banks

in the

United States' economy, safe and

sound banking practices are highly important. Securities-related
banks were considered

would undermine

to

activities

of commercial

be speculative, profit-seeking and risk-taking ventures which

the effectiveness of "safety and soundness" of banking practices.

It

was

believed that if banks combined traditional banking with corporate securities activities

such

as

underwriting,

trading,

mismanagement and unacceptable

investment
risk-taking

advisory

and

would happen.

6

brokerage

services,

Therefore, there

was

See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basis for Continued
Separation of Comercial and Investment Banking, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 647, 676 (1986).
60
See G. BROKER, COMPETITION IN BANKING 83 (1989).
61

Id.

63

See Lorenzo, supra note 59, at 676.
See BROKER, supra not 60, at 83.
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a

15

need

for appropriate regulatory

measures

to separate

commercial banking and investment

banking.

A
is

basic reason for separating the investment and commercial banking activities

inherent

in

intermediaries,

basic

65

and

of banks

functions

depositories

as

Non-banking corporate

creditors.

for

savings,

activities,

payments

such as securities

underwriting, are not supportive of or consistent with these above-mentioned essential

banking services.

undermine banks'

66

In addition,

was believed

it

ability to provide traditional

that

bank

securities activities

banking services.

67

Although the major purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act was

to protect banks' safety

and soundness, restore public confidence and avoid conflicts of interest
banking business, the rationale basis

itself contains defects that

Empirical studies show that bank failures
in the securities business, but

to

maintain bank reserves and

were more related

money

inappropriate or disruptive actions

words, the banking

crisis

at that

in

would

in the

commercial

can not be overcome.

time were not caused by banks engaging
to: 1)

the failure of the Federal Reserve

supply, 2) the unit banking system, 3) and effects of

by

the Congress and President Roosevelt.

69

In other

1930s was ultimately due to "general economic

the

conditions exacerbated by tax increases, protectionist trade measures, and a restrictive

monetary policy."

70

Actually,

it

was

and the regulatory reform contained
itself, that

to

some

"the erection of the federal deposit insurance system
in the

Banking Act of 1933," not the Glass-Steagall

mainly affected the restoration of safety and soundness of banks.

studies,

banks which had

affiliates in the securities

According

business were more resistant

64

Id.
65

See Lorenzo, supra note 59,

66

Id. at

at

653-54.

654.

67

Id.
68

See George

J.

Benston, The Origins of and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act,

SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING 45
™Id.
'°
William M. Isaac & Melanie
Rev. 281,286(1988).

Edward D.

L. Fein,

Facing the Future— Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37 Cath. U.

Sullivan, Glass-Steagall Update: Proposals to

indurstry, 112

Banking

L.J.

ANTHONY

(1996).

977, 982 (1995).

L.

Modernize the Structure of Financial Services
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to failures

there

is

during the 1930s banking

no evidence

to

show

that

7?

crisis.

As

regards conflict of interest concerns,

banks would abuse

Potential conflict of interest could exist in

their

any business

powers against

in

their clients.

which fiduciary

73

relations are

involved, such as brokerage and insurance businesses. Traditional banking business also

contains such kind of conflicts.

Since banks are normally proficient investors,
to

make excessive

it is

hard to imagine that banks tend

speculation on imprudent stocks. "Unless a bank

is

trying to bankrupt
74

Banks have

itself," there is

no reason

many market

incentives to restrict their investment activities, including commercial

for

it

engage

to

lending and securities activities.

investments in securities

how

is

5

in excessive risk-taking activities.

Since there

inherently

more

is

no reasonable explanation of why

risky than commercial banking activities,

the Glass-Steagall Act reduces the risks of banks to

decisions

is far

chip stocks,

investment

77

clear.

Actually, investing in

inherently far less risky than

is

78

trusts.

their portfolio

"interest

enact

to

some

high-quality stocks, such as blue

some commercial

loans, such as real estate

their activities are

more

79

risky.

group" theory, investment banks have incentives

There

believe that the motivation of Congress in enacting Glass-Steagall

was

See

to

persuade

laws that prohibit commercial banks from investment banking

business, in order to reduce competitors and lessen competition.

72

investment

Subject to the Glass-Steagall restrictions, banks can not diversify

of assets, and thus

Under
legislators

from

make imprudent

is

reason to

not purely to

MACHEY & MILLER., supra not 3, at 507.

See George

J.

Benston, The Origins of and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act,

SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING

ANTHONY

59 (1996).

Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislative and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of
Emory L.J. 1,13 (1984).

Glass-Steagall, 33
75

Id.
76

Id. at 11.
77

Id.
78

Id.
79

80

/</.atl3.

See Benston,

76

SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra

note 68, at 60.
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protect the public interest. Furthermore,

and investment banking

The Bank

is

some argue

for International Settlements (BIS), an organization
X

•

to enter the securities business

According

from investment banks.

82

to the

83

The

line

between

institution,

many
B.

to

tend to acquire

banking and the

traditional

changing technology

which was unpredicted when Congress issued the Glass-Steagall Act.

Moreover, customers tend

one

BIS study, "allowing

when companies

investment banking business has been blurred by the rapid

environment,

of central banks,

would give them an additional opportunity

diversify and create an alternative source of revenue,"

financing

of commercial

not economically necessary, but an artificial regulation.

conducted a study on financial services reform.

banks

that the separation

to obtain the full

range of financial services they need within

because of the convenience resulting from the interchangeable nature of

financial products.

4

Competitiveness and Efficiency

become one of

Universal banking has
modernization.

One of

the inevitable tendencies of financial

the characteristics of universal banking

banking powers, including bank securities powers.

the expansion of

is

Since "the demarcation lines

between the various financial sectors have become increasingly blurred", there
for financial integration

restrictions

of the banking and securities businesses.

on bank involvement

in securities activities

is

a need

Accordingly, legal

have become antiquated and

should be removed from the current regulatory regime.

Study supports commercial banks

to

engage

in securities activities,

17

NO.

15 Banking

PoPy Rep.

2

(1998)
82

Id.
XI

See

J.

2 N.C.

Virgil Mattingly

Banking

Inst.

25,

& Keiran

J.

Fallon, Understanding the Issues

Raised by Financial Modernization,

26 (1998).

84

Id.
85

86

See Macey, supra note 49,

Mary

E. Footer,

at

204.

GA TT and the Multilateral Regulation of Banking Services, 27

(1993)
87

See Macey, supra note 49,

at

204.

Int'l

Law. 343, 345-346
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The regulatory framework of E.U. banking law was designed

for the universal

banking model, which combines both commercial banking and investment banking.
Banks, under a universal banking system, are able to conduct a broad range of investment
including underwriting securities.

activities,

88

Therefore, E.U. banks could effectively

diversify their investment portfolios and thus obtain

many

profit opportunities both in

domestic and international markets. Subject to less restrictive regulations, universal banks

would have competitive advantages over other banks which bear heavy regulatory
burdens. The adoption of the Second Banking Directive
increase competition

among

by Member

States

would

banks, and thus change market shares and push European
oq

banks
"the

to

EC

expand
will

During the financial integration process,

into international markets.

become among

the

most competitive of the world's financial markets, with

numbers of indigenous and foreign-based players clustered

large

The

groups".

efficient

and innovative E.U. financial markets could not only create

economy, but enhance the competitiveness of E.U.

internal benefits for E.U. regional

banking

in the global

in distinct strategic

arena as well.

91

Before the implementation of the Financial Services Act of 1999, U.S. banks have
experienced a long-term erosion in their market shares of commercial and industrial loans

by other
result

faced

financial institutions such as investment

banks and insurance companies.

"

As

a

of financial market development and technology innovations, U.S. banks have

and

will

continue

to

face

fierce

organizations and international banks.

93

competition

These financial

from

domestic

institutions

non-banking

had considerable

competitive advantages over U.S. banking organizations, not because they had some

See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Annex.
See Christopher T. Toll, The European Community 's Second Banking Directive: Can Antiquated United
States Legislation Keep Pace? 23 Vand. J. Transnat'l 615, 643-44 (1990).
90

See

SAUNDERS & WALTER,

supra note 30,

at 123.

91

Id.
"
See Julie L. Williams
Law. 783, 785(1995).

93

Id.

&

Mark

P. Jacobsen,

The Business of Banking: Looking

to the Future,

50 Bus.
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intrinsic

advantages, but because they bore comparatively less stringent regulatory

burdens than U.S. banks did.

were more
companies

94

Accordingly, non-banking institutions and foreign banks

For example, when

flexible in lowering their costs to attract businesses.
try to get funds

lowest cost. There

is

from financial markets, they must seek financing with the

no difference between the funds from commercial loans and from

public capital markets, except that getting

money from commercial banks

costs more.

Therefore, companies tend to obtain funds from securities markets. Commercial banks

keep losing

their markets,

because their clients would lower their cost of obtaining

financing by selling securities instead of getting loans from commercial banks.

6

Technology innovations have affected substantially the competitiveness of
commercial banks

bank

in the

modern market. The previous

structure

activities has already negatively effected the stability

U.S. financial markets.

Since there

is

no

97

One important

financial

of legal

restrictions

and competitive fairness

market development

is

on

in the

securitization.

legal barrier to investment firms or other nonfinancial institutions

issuing loans, the securities industry and other nonfinancial industries have increasingly

entered

into

traditional

securitization process.

98

banking areas by providing loan equivalents through the

While lowering

capital costs

and improving the capital allocation

process, securitization has resulted in a diminution in

demand

for

commercial

loans.

Since banks were subject to more stringent activity restrictions, they have been kept out

of many profitable businesses.

by banks, because

financial

1

Securitization also jeopardizes the quality of assets held
institutions

only securitize the best assets in a bank's

id
95

96

Id. at 786.

See Macey, supra note 49, 206.

97

Id.

See David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment Banks and Other
Nonbanks, 44 Emory L.J. 1187, 1210-12(1995).
See Macey, supra note 49, at 207.
100

Id.
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Since

portfolio.

would choose

many

profitable

companies

that

securities markets as their financial resource,

concentrate on increasingly risky borrowers

problems.

meet the requirement

who have

for securitization

banks have been forced

to

relatively serious information

102

In the traditional deposit-taking and credit businesses, banks have been losing

who

consumers,

more

which

are

firms

now

increasingly are investing a great part of their savings in other markets
attractive

providing

are
1

For example,

businesses.
equivalents,

and profitable than deposits.
services

many nonbank

which can function

rates

106

unbearable
securities

risks.

than

Subject to

is

the

Investment banks and insurance

deposit-taking

institutions

credit-providing

can provide various deposit

and checking accounts.

money market

traditional

and

fund,

which can

1

OS

One of

offer higher

some exceptions under commercial banking

can provide services traditionally offered by

insurance.

105

banking accounts do, without raising

firm can purchase a single thrift institution as a subsidiary.

securities firm

FDIC

customers

to

to

as traditional deposit

these significant deposit equivalents
interest

similar

10

Through some loopholes

in

the

107

thrift institutions

law,

a

Thus, the

covered by

bank regulatory framework,

investment firms can provide various kinds of services traditionally associated with

commercial banks, thus becoming financial supermarkets, which can offer one-stop
financial shopping.

1

Besides investment banks, other financial entities have also

moved

aggressively into various financial businesses, providing financial products such as credit
cards, traveler's checks,

and financial management accounts.

101

Id.
102

Id. at
103

207-10.

See Williams

&

Jacobsen, supra note 92,

104

Id.
105

See Eaton, supra note 98,

106

Id.
107

Id. at 1202.

108

Id.
109

m

Id. at

1203-07.

Id. at

1207-09.

at

1201.

at

786.

110

As

a result, commercial

21

banks have
traditional

from both financial and non-financial enterprises

to face fierce competition

banking businesses. Moreover, when commercial banks have turned

risky business areas, they

still

to

in

more

can not avoid the increasingly intense competition from

non-banking organizations."

Although banks have sought
been able

to

engage

in the securities business, they

compete effectively with investment banks

to

activity restrictions in previous U.S.

banking law

partially

have not

because of the extensive

banks

that permitted

1

investments only to limited areas, which are not always profitable.

1

to allocate their

7

This, in turn, led to
1

1

^

of assets by commercial banks as normal market participants.

misallocation

a

Moreover, since commercial banks
2) are subjected to

more

1)

need more capital

to

fund their lending operations,

stringent capital requirements, and, 3)

move

assets at a

much

lower rate than investment banks, commercial banks have greater exposure to both credit
risk

and

114

interest-rate risk.

Accordingly, the advantage of

FDIC

insurance can not

overcome the disadvantage flowing from comparatively narrow business

options.

In order to deal effectively with both domestic non-banking organizations and
international universal banks, U.S. banking organizations

customers

and

to

develop

new

businesses.

115

While

have

to

economic

maintain existing

development

and

technology advancement have transformed the financial market, the previous regulatory

regime on bank investment

activities prevents

non-banking institutions and foreign firms
If

banks continue

to shrink their

in

banks from competing effectively with

both domestic and international markets.

market shares and take on higher risks in commercial
117

•

loans, they will collectively threaten the safety

in
112

See Williams

& Jacobsen, supra note

See Bevis Longstreth

et al., U.S.

92, at 786.

Id.

See Macey, supra note 49, at 206.
See Williams & Jacobsen, supra note 92, at 786.
See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 83, at 26-27
See Williams & Jacobsen, supra note 92, at 786.

'.

1

and soundness of the banking system.

Banking Reform: Getting Beyond the Oxymoron, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am.

683,723(1992).
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116

22

This consequence would be directly contrary to the original purpose of separating the

commercial and investment banking businesses.
Reciprocity concerns

C.

While U.S. banking organizations were subject
under the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding

to stringent activities restrictions

Company

Act, their subsidiaries have

enjoyed the benefits of more relaxed regulation when operating abroad. Subject to some

on underwriting and dealing

limitations

in certain equity securities, foreign subsidiaries

of U.S. banks and bank holding companies were allowed to underwrite and deal

and equity securities

Company Act.
competitive

in foreign countries

K

of the Bank Holding

Realizing that these limits on bank securities activities have reduced the

of

ability

banking

U.S.

K

implemented Regulation

Revisions.

on U.S. banks engaging

limitations

under Regulation

in debt

dealing in equity securities.

organizations,
119

the

The Regulation

in securities activities

Federal

K

Reserve

Revisions

Board

liberalized

such as underwriting and

1

Section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, also called the Edge Act, authorizes

own

national banks to

so-called

international banking activities.

U.S.

bank

operations.

that
122

is

formed

121

for

Banks have found

because they can engage

in a

Edge Act corporations

An Edge

118

that enable

them

P.

that establishing

120

Id. at

Edge Act Corporations

123

is

financial

attractive

These corporations have sufficiently expanded

in the international

Initiatives in International

12

Nw.

3, at

700.

and Cooperation,

market effectively.

124

J.

Int'l

Financial Regulation and Competitiveness,

& Bus.

241, 258 (1991).

257.

12U.S.C. §611 (1978).
See MACHEY & MILLER, supra note

m Id.
124

a domestic subsidiary of a

broad range of international financial businesses without

compete

Trachtman, Recent

Effectiveness, Consistency

122

is

12C.F.R.§211.5(d)(13)(1994).

See Joel

121

to

Act corporation

purpose of conducting

purpose of engaging in international

the

being subject to state law restrictions.

powers

for the

Henri Moudi, The State of U.S. Banking

in the

Global Arena, 10 B.U.

Int'l L.J.

255, 275 (1992).

23

Subject to Glass-Steagall Act restrictions, which generally prohibited banks from

engaging

of

in securities business,

less restrictive regulations.

subject to

more relaxed

It

banks operating domestically could not enjoy the benefit

was questioned why U.S. banking

restrictions

on

125
It

be

their investment activities abroad, if the separation

of commercial banking from investment banking

soundness of banking system.

institutions could

is

so important to protect the safety and

seemed unreasonable

to relax restrictions

on U.S.

banking overseas, while prohibiting banks within the U.S. from entering the investment
banking business.

If

allowing U.S. banks abroad to principally engage in the securities

business does not threaten the stability of the U.S. banking system, regulatory authorities

should also remove activities restrictions on banks operating domestically.

Under

the national treatment approach, foreign banks,

when

126

operating in the

United States, should be subject to the United States banking regulations which

bank investment

activities.

prohibitions, and there

these exceptions were

Although there were some exceptions from the general

were some exceptions

somewhat narrow.

"

that

were only applied

to foreign banks,

For instance, E.U. banks could conduct a

range of financial activities under the Second Banking Directive.

banks are operating

their subsidiaries in the

When

full

to

United States, they are subject to the U.S.

domestic banks, E.U. credit institutions were not permitted

From

their

home

country regulations.

the United State perspective,

to E.U. credit institutions,

25

to

to foreign

provide the

range of services to the same extent as they have been permitted by the Second

Banking Directive and

126

full

these universal

banking regulatory regime. Although the U.S. had a more relaxed approach

banks than

restrict

See Trachtman, supra note

1

it

128

has offered a better-than-national treatment

because there were some special exemptions applied to E.U.

19, at 258-59.

259(1991).
See Michael Gruson, Non-Banking Activities of Foreign Banks Operating
Id.

in the

United

MICHAEL GRUDSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS
See Trachtman, supra note

1

19, at 273.

States,

9-3 (1991).
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1

Company

banks from the general prohibitions of Bank Holding

TQ

According

Act.

to U.S.

banking regulations, E.U. credit institutions had broader powers than U.S. domestic
banking organizations

did.

same competitive opportunities available

States failed to offer the
failed to

However, from the European Union point of view, the United
to U.S. banks,

and also

meet the conditions of effective market access under Article 9 of the Second

Banking Directive, because the United States was imposing barriers
130

institutions.

For example, subject

to

Regulation

K

to

E.U. credit

under the Bank Holding

Company

Act, U.S. banking organizations could conduct a broader range of activities, including

some equity
conduct

securities underwriting, in the

in the

United States.

131

European Union than they were allowed

to

Consequently, the European Union considered that the

United States did not provide the same competitive opportunities to E.U. banks

who were

seeking access to the United States market as opportunities the European Union have

provided to U.S. banks

in the

E.U. market.

More

specifically,

compared

to U.S. firms

operating in European Union countries, E.U. credit institutions were subject to more
stringent regulatory regime

when

operating in the United States.

principle of reciprocal treatment, the

with the United State to moderate
in the full

its

133

Thus, under the

European Union would have incentives

to negotiate

banking regulations to allow E.U. banks

to

engage

range of financial services that they can engage in under E.U. law and

home

state laws.

While banks have had considerable success
that

expansion has not been smooth or

in

effortless.

expanding into securities business,
Competition both from domestic

investment banks and international financial institutions has narrowed their options for
maintaining reasonable profit margins and different regulatory regimes have increased
their operating costs. Nevertheless, U.S.

129

Id. at 271.

130

Id.
131

132

12 C.F.R. §22 1.5(d)
See Trachtman, supra note

1

19, at 273.

banks have started to benefit from a liberalizing

25

banking regulatory regime, and with the implementation of the Financial Services Act of
1999, U.S. banks and bank holding companies can
financial services.

133

Id.

now

legally provide a full range

of

CHAPTER

IV

EXPANDED BANKING POWERS
Despite the manifest restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act on banks' ability to

engage

securities

in

companies and
business

their

non-bank

1980s and

the

in

and securities-related
affiliates

1990s.

134

activities,

national

banks,

bank holding

aggressively entered the investment banking

Most of

this

expansion can be attributed

to

technology innovations, declines in the traditional deposit-taking and commercial lending

expansion of the securities business, favorable interpretations of

businesses,

rapid

existing law

by banking agencies and

courts,

the globalization of financial markets.

135

judicial interpretations that significantly

expanded

activities in foreign countries,

and

This chapter analyzes regulatory changes and

have broadened banking powers

in

financial

markets, and evaluates the recent trend of mergers and acquisitions of investment banks

by bank holding companies.

134

See Northern

& Olive, supra

note 15, at 267.

135

See George G. Kaufman & Larry R. Mote, Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and Judicial
Reinterpretation, 107 banking L.J. 388, 400 (1990). Lhe author gives five major reasons that attributes

to

accelerated expansion of bank securities powers:
"1

.

Improvements in technology that have reduced sharply the costs of information processing and
communications. The new technology held out the promise of economies of scope in conducting
expanded securities activities alongside the bank's currently permissible securities, lending, and deposit

3.

4.

some

expanded activities can be offered using in-place personnel.
from traditional commercial banking activities have declined. This
phenomenon is particularly true of lending to large, high-grade corporation, many of which are finding
it cheaper to sell their own commercial paper than to borrow from banks. Techology has contributed to
this development by increasing the availability and reducing the cost of credit information and analysis
for these firms to the public, thereby eroding commercial bank's comparative advantages in this area.
The perceived rapid growth and large profits in full-service securities activities at least up to and
through the time of the stock market crash in October 1987 as the volume and complexity of securities
have both increased sharply.
More liberal interpretations of the language of existing legislation by both the regulatory agencies and

activities. In
2.

Search for

new

cases, these

activities as profits

the courts.
5.

The growing

internationalization of financial markets,

in securities activities in

many

which has provided U.S. banks with experience

foreign countries, and intensified competition with foreign banks in both

domestic and foreign markets."

26

27

banking agencies and the courts have eroded

Federal

limitations

investment activities set by the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding

According

such as brokerage

and mutual

investments,

companies are able

to

activities,

funds.

Act.

13t

137

in securities

and securities-related

underwriting and dealing securities, own-account

As

a

result,

national

banks and bank holding

involve in extensive non-banking businesses that most U.S.

investment banks have engaged

in.

Expanded Banking Powers by Financial Agency

A.

Company

agency interpretations and court holdings, commercial banks and

to favorable

bank holding companies have successfully engaged
areas,

on bank

Interpretations

and Judicial

Precedence

When

national banks were trying to

businesses, the

OCC

activities

OCC

139

In addition,

by implementing

through their operating subsidiaries.

nonbank

affiliates.

to the regulatory

its

new Operating

Subsidiaries

has allowed national banks to engage in a wide range of securities

broadened the scope of businesses
their

securities firms in investment

has rendered favorable interpretations that reduced limitations under

the Glass-Steagal Act.

Rule, the

compete with

in

For example,

140

The Federal Reserve Board has

also

which bank holding companies can engage through
in late

1996 and 1997, through substantial revisions

regime by the Federal Reserve Board, banking holding companies were

allowed to engage in broader securities underwriting and dealing

activities.

Generally, the Courts have helped banking agency interpretations in favor of

expansion of banking powers,

if

these interpretations are reasonable, and not arbitrary

136

Id.
137

See Eaton, supra note 98, 1 196-99.
See Lee Meyerson & William D. Anderson,

Jr., Acquisitions of Investment Banks and Securities Firms
by Bank Holding Companies, 1091 PLI/Corp 385, 394 (1998).
139
See Northon & Olive, supra note 15, at 268.
140
12C.F.R. §5.34(d)(1997)
141
See R. Nicholas Rodelli, The New Operating Standards for Section 20 Subsidiaries: The Reserve
Board 's Prudent March Toward Financial Ser\'ices Modernization, 2 N.C. Banking Inst. 3 1 1 (1998).
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and capricious.

142

the requirement of reasonableness,

The Court has expressly found
not

limited

to

specifically, in the

and

their

and Federal Reserve interpretations easily met

when they

enumerated

securities activities outside the

is

OCC

For example, the

authorize banks to engage in a variety of

activities permitted

that the business

of banking

is

by

federal

banking law.

143

an expansive concept that

those enumerated activities in the federal banking

law.

144

More

1980s and 1990s, the Court had established that banking organizations

subsidiaries

can

engage

in

investment

advisory,

securities

commercial paper placement, and even securities underwriting and selling
as dealing in corporate debt

and equity

brokerage,

such

activities,

145

securities.

Brokerage Activities

a.

The U.S. banking law has allowed commercial banks
upon the order of and

for the accounts

of

their customers.

to

buy and

146

sell securities

Until the late

1970s,

although the Glass-Steagall Act did not plainly prohibit discount brokerage services, the

OCC had discouraged
1980s,

in the early

by

active securities brokerage services

when

Bank

Securities Pacific National

brokerage Services through a

new

subsidiary, the

1983, the Federal Reserve Board approved the

national banks.

OCC

147

However,

applied to offer discount
1

approved

this application.

BankAmerica Corporation's

of the

challenged the
the

42

See Northern
Id. at

145

146

company.

& Olive, supra note

15, at 267.

267-68.

VALIC, 115

v.

See Northon

& Olive, supra note

S. Ct.

810(1995)

15, at 273-74.

12U.S.C. §24(1994)
See Kaufman & Mote, supra note 135,
Id.

149

Id.

Although

Securities

Industry

it

as a

Association

and Federal Reserve Board's interpretations on brokerage services,

Nationsbank

148

14

Supreme Court upheld these two

143

144

OCC

holding

In

application to

acquire the country's largest discount broker, Charles Schwab, and operate
subsidiary

4R

at

401.

financial

agencies'

approvals,

holding

that

29

Regulation

Clarke

v.

Y permits

banking

institutions to

engage

in

discount brokerage services.

150

In

Securities Indus. Ass'n, the court has ruled that banks can operate discount

brokerage offices in different states without being subject to branching restrictions.
Regulation

Y

has considered

some permissible discount brokerage

activities incidental to the business

of banking.

15

some

Subject to

services

limitations,

bank holding companies may also provide investment research and advisory
sophisticated

investors.

subsidiaries of

15

Since

1984,

bank holding companies

the

to

has also authorized banks to conduct
b.

full securities

brokerage services

full

and companies, including investment companies.

In

be

banks and

activities to

Reserve Board has authorized

Federal

provide

to

151

its

to individuals

OCC

interpretative letters, the

brokerage services,

Underwriting and Dealing in Securities

The Glass-Steagall Act authorized commercial banks

some

to underwrite

and deal

bank-eligible securities, such as government securities, securities of the bank

and securities of other national banks.

by banks was

1

6

in

itself,

Underwriting and dealing in commercial paper
1

also not subject to Glass-Steagall restrictions,

"

but in

its initial

Section 20

approval orders, the Federal Reserve Board only permitted underwriting and dealing in

commercial

However,

paper,

municipal

in 1987, the Federal

revenue

bonds

Reserve Board began

bank holding companies and foreign banks
159

securities.

Then

and

the Federal Reserve

to

mortgage-backed

to authorize

engage

in

151

152
153

154
155

156
157
158
159

subsidiaries of

underwriting and dealing in

Board broadened

Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577, F. Supp.

Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984)
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987)
12 C.F.R. §225.25(1994)
National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1986)
Kaufman & Mote, supra note 135, at 401 (1990)
OCC Interpretative Letter, No. 386, 403, 1988-89. OCC Interpretative
12 U.S.C. §24(1994)
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (1986)
73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987)
See Meyerson & Anderson, supra note 138, at 387.

Ass'n

nonbank

securities.

its

rulings approving

252 (1983), Securities Indus.

v.

Letter,

No. 591, 1992

bank

30

holding companies to underwrite and deal

However, there were a
20 subsidiaries had

of limitations on

to

of bank holding companies. Section

ensure the safety and soundness of depository institutions.

Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board
activities

of section 20

securities

was

5%

affiliates

affiliates.

The

of the subsidiary's

set

a

strict

original limit
total

revenues.

revenue limitation on ineligible

on revenue derived from
162

ineligible

Then, in 1989, when the Federal

Reserve authorized subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite and deal
types of corporate securities, the revenue limit on ineligible activities

10%.

163

The

nonbank

affiliate

significantly

on the percentage of revenues derived from

ceiling

was

raised to

25%

in

late

1996.

164

through their

affiliates.

to underwrite

c.

march toward

a "prudent

to

of a

ineligible activities

limitation

and deal

in

Thus, while there was not meaningful

legislative modification to financial regulatory regime, the Federal

made

in all

was increased

The new revenue

broadened the power of bank holding companies

securities

ineligible

16

be separately capitalized and were subject to a number of firewalls

to

were designed

that

lot

corporate debt and equity securities.

in

Reserve Board has

financial services modernization."

Mutual funds

The mutual fund industry has grown rapidly during recent two decades. As
their business diversification,

part of

banks and bank holding companies have been successfully

involved in the mutual fund industry. National banks and bank holding companies have

been authorized

10

to sell

mutual funds either directly or through their subsidiaries.

The Federal Reserve Board granted contingent approval

companies

to

to applications

underwrite and deal in corporate debt securities. Then, year

from

later,

five large

166

Bank

bank holding

they were allowed to

underwrite and deal in corporate equity securities. These five large bank holding companies included:

Morgan

& Co.,

Inc, the

Chase Manhattan Corporation, Bankers Trust

New York Corporation,

J. P.

Citicorp,

and

Security Pacific Corporation. 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192-217 (1989)
161

162
163

Regulation

Y

Amendments, 62 Fed. Reg. At 45

75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192(1989)

See Meyerson

&

Anderson, supra note 138,

at 388.

Revenue Limit on Bank-ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged
Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68, 750-752 (1996)
165

Rodelli, supra note 141, at 31

in

1.

See Jane E. Willis, Banks and Mutual Funds: A Functional Approach
Rev. 221,222(1995).

to

Reform, 1995 Colum. Bus. L.

31

holding companies can organize, sponsor, and manage a closed-end fund.
the Federal Reserve

mutual funds

is

Board has determined

closely related to banking.

d.

168

In

September 1997, the

bank

to

OCC

sell

issued an

mutual fund

16

Abroad

Securities Activities

A

Moreover,

that providing administrative services to

interpretive letter permitting an operating subsidiary of a
shares.

167

lot

of banks have subsidiaries operating

banks are permitted

to

in foreign countries

conduct a broader range of

17

activities.

operating subsidiaries in the European Union countries
services.

Large bank holding companies have

where commercial

For example, U.S. bank

may engage

affiliates registered as

in full financial

members of major

stock exchanges in foreign countries and can provide investment advisory and brokerage
services to their clients regarding to foreign stock trading.

Apart from the above developments, favorable regulatory changes and judicial
interpretations

have allowed national banks

to provide a

These services include: underwriting and dealing

in

broad range of financial services.

government

securities, dealing in

debt instruments, Eurodollar instruments, and other eligible instruments, engaging in
private placement of commercial paper; providing full brokerage services and investment

advisory services, trading in futures, options,

mortgage backed
securities in

securities,

and underwrite and deal

accordance with certain limitations.

broader range of permissible

and derivative contracts, dealing

activities.

171

in

in

debt and equity corporate

Bank holding companies have an even

Besides involvement in financial activities that

can be conducted by banks and operating subsidiaries, bank holding companies can

'

7

16s

69

12 C.F.R. section 225.25(b)(14)(1994).

Bankers Trust

New York Corporation,

See Robert M. Kurucza
Law. 1145, 1151 (1998).
170
171

&

Barry

I.

83 Fed. Res. Bull. 780 (1997).
Pershkow, Securities and Investment Activities of Banks, 53 Bus.

See Kaufman & Mote, supra note 135, at 400.
Norton & Olive, supra note 15, at 268-270
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engage

approved by the Federal Reserve Board.

in additional securities activities

Through amendments

to

Regulation

Y

and codifying interpretations, the Federal Reserve

Board has allowed bank holding companies

exchange-traded
activities

to

and options,

futures

underwriting

Nationsbank

Bank

banks.

new

bank-ineligible

that are permissible for

Act, and that

it

would give

is

not limited to the enumerated powers in the

substantial deference to reasonable decisions

Comptroller of the Currency interpreting permissible activities of national

174

According

to this

activities for national

1

IS

This

20, 1996.

engage

in a

new

Supreme Court
banks

that are

decision, the

OCC

has discretion to authorize

beyond enumerated powers. Subsequently, the

its

new Operating

Subsidiary Rule on

November

*

rule, effective

on December 31, 1996, would allow national banks

broader range of activities through their subsidiaries.

provides: "a national bank

may

activities

in

Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co, the Supreme Court

v.

Comptroller of the Currency announced

to

and dealing

Subsidiary Rule

expressly held that the business of banking

the

broad range of financial

in a

17

OCC's New Operating
In

by

engage

and other securities

a certain extent,

national banks.

National

to

including investment advisory and fund-management activities, dealing in most

activities,

B.

172

may

176

The new standard

establish or acquire an operating subsidiary to conduct, or

conduct in an existing operating subsidiary, activities that are part of or incidental to

the business of banking, as determined

by

the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to

12 U.S.C. 24( Seventh), and other activities permissible for national banks or their
subsidiaries under other statutory authority."

177

172

Id.

m Id.
174

Nationsbank

v.

Variable Annuity Life Insurance,

1

15 S. Ct.

810 (1995).

Key Issues Surrounding New OCC Op-Sub Rule Addressed In Q-and-A,
7,7(1996)
176
The New American Banking Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1310, 1314(1997).
177

12C.F.R. §5.34(d)(l)(1997)

15 No. 24 Banking Pol'y Rep.
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The old

were

Part 5 Rules allowed national banks only to conduct activities that

7K

"part of or incidental to the business of banking" through operating subsidiaries.

In

order to conduct these incidental activities through the operating subsidiary, the parent

bank had

own

to

at least

80%

of the voting shares of the subsidiary.

Rule, if a national bank intended to conduct

5

subsidiary,

it

had

to file

some prudent banking

new

179

Under

through an operating

activities

an application to the Comptroller of the Currency.

principles, the Comptroller

the old Part

had the authority

to

Adhering

determine whether
1

these

new

activities

The new

were legally permissible

reducing
182

80%.

minimum

To

for an operating subsidiary

added

it

voting stock ownership requirement by national banks to

qualify the

subsidiary, the parent

new

rule's requirement, the parent

bank could even hold

subsidiary, if no other person

1

less than

owns more than 50%.

establish or operate an operating subsidiary

bank has

some

50%

184

to

own

of the voting

50%

at least

To

from

50%

of

control a

interest in the

Moreover, a national bank

by means of "a

may

corporation, limited liability

8S

new

Part 5 Rule enhances flexibility of the

For certain businesses, a well-capitalized bank

OCC

by

or similar entity".

Second, the

the

1

operating subsidiary structure

flexibility for the

the voting stock of the subsidiary or otherwise control the subsidiary.

company

Q

of a bank.

Part 5 Rule significantly expands permissible activities of national banks

several ways. First,

in

to

within ten days after

activities

it

may submit

OCC

approval procedures.

an "after-the-fact notice" to

establishes or operates an operating subsidiary.

For

such as securities brokerage, underwriting and dealing in permissible

m Id. §5.34(c)
179

Id.
180

/</.§5.34(d)(l)(i).
181

How Far Has the OCC Opened the
Nonbanking Activities? 2 N.C. Banking Inst. 264, 267 (1998). 12 C.F.R. section 5.34(d)(l)(iii).
See James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free at Last or More of Samel 46 Depaul L. Rev.
See William T. McCuiston, National Bank Operating Subsidiaries:

Door
~

to

651,664-65(1997).
183

12 C.F.R. §5.34(d)(2)

184

Id.
l

*5

Id.

m Id. §5 34(e)(2)
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securities, the

OCC may

conduct expedited review, which means that an national bank's

application to conduct these activities through a operating subsidiary
i

0-7

days of submitting the application, unless notifies otherwise.
involved in some
file

new

activities that

an application to the

OCC

may

to

after ten

t

If a

bank intends

above-mentioned categories,

and get approval before

it

conducts such a

Therefore, through the

through an operating subsidiary.

banks

do not belong

approved

is

new

enjoy less burdensome procedural requirements

new

be

to

must

it

activity

Part 5 Rule, national

when

they are trying to

broaden their businesses.

Another change, perhaps the most controversial one,

new

increased
rule, the

OCC

that
1

activities in

which operating subsidiaries can engage.

RQ

the

OCC

Under

the

has

new

has the authority to allow an operating subsidiary to engage in activities

that are prohibited to its parent bank.
activities that are permissible to

to

is

190

The new

bank operating

determine on a case-by-case basis whether a

business of banking.

192

Accordingly, the

rule does not explicitly

subsidiaries.

new

new

Instead,

it

list

certain

allows the

OCC

activity is part of, or incidental to the

rule significantly

expands the OCC's

authority as well as permissible activities of bank operating subsidiaries. For example, the

OCC may

allow bank operating subsidiaries to engage
1

securities.

engaging

Act

is

the underwriting of corporate

Since section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act explicitly prohibited banks from

in corporate securities underwriting, the

to authorize

bank operating subsidiaries

Similarly, the Federal Reserve

to

OCC mainly relied on section 20 of the

conduct ineligible securities

activities.

Board has allowed section 20 subsidiaries of banking

holding companies to engage in ineligible activities as long as they are not their primary

187

m

/rf.§5.34(e)(3)

Jd.

189
1

§5.34(e)(l)(i)(A)

See McCuiston, supra note 181, at 268.
See Smoot, supra note 182, at 665-66.
See Key Issues, supra note 175.

192

/J.

See The
194

Id.

New American Banking Law,

supra note 176, at 1319.
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195

activities.

Subject to the Fed interpretations on "engaged principally" in bank-ineligible

196

activities.

As

OCC

a result, the

bank operating subsidiaries
affiliates

approved Zions

bonds through

to involve in a

wide variety of

First

its

11,

new

1997, applying the

revenue from ineligible

way

that allows

financial businesses in

which

operating-subsidiary rule, the

operating subsidiaries.

of the bank-ineligible securities

197

activities,

operating subsidiaries of national banks
not engaged principally in

In

is

199
it.

subsidiary of Zions

would

revenue bonds up to

25%

201

limit its

of

its total

One may

explained that

part of or incidental to the business of
in

revenue bonds

affiliates

may engage

In addition, the

OCC

decision, the

its

OCC

is

considered to be one

of bank holding companies and

in this business so long as they are

applied the Federal Reserve Board's

revenue limitation on Zions' proposed securities

securities activities.

OCC

National Bank's application to underwrite and deal in revenue

Although underwriting and dealing

banking.

C.

its

reinterpreted Glass-Steagall Act in a

underwriting and dealing in revenue bonds

freedom

of

of bank holding companies can engage.

On December

25%

25%

an operating subsidiary can earn up to

activities,

00

activities.

Since the operating

income earned from underwriting and dealing
revenue,

it

is

in

not principally engaged in ineligible

predict that national banks will be able to enjoy greater

to involve in profitable financial businesses.

The Fed's

New

Operating Standards for Section 20 Subsidiaries

Although the Federal Reserve Board attacked the OCC's new operatingsubsidiary

195

Mat

rule,

which has expanded permissible investment

activities

of bank

1320.

196

Id
See John L. Douglas, Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Zions First
National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah to Commence New Activities in an Operating Subsidiary, Elcec Glass-

Cle51 (1997).
198

Id.
199

See McCuiston, supra note 181,

200

Id. at

m Id.

at

284-85 (1998).

285.

OCC's Op-Sub Rule Comes under Increasing Attack From Greemspan, D'Amato,
Pol'y Rep. 5(1997).

16 No. 10 Banking
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subsidiaries,

1987

it

took significant steps to eliminate old section 20 firewalls effective

that separate extraordinary securities activities

to facilitate

bank holding companies'

from traditional banking.

in

intended

It

with subsidiaries engaged in investment

affiliation

banking businesses. In a meeting on August 21, 1997, the Federal Reserve Board

approved a proposal replacing old firewalls with new operating standards
facilitate

bank holding companies'

section 20 subsidiaries.

2

ability to

in

and increase

that

their competitive ability,

of banking business and avoiding conflict of

many of

the old limitations had

regulatory regime.

current

operating standards, bank holding companies
services,

would

conduct securities business through their

The Board believed

became unnecessarily burdensome

that

would be able

to

204

Under

the

new

reduce costs, enhance

while ensuring the safety and soundness
interests. °

Through

its

new

operating

standards of section 20 subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve Board has balanced the
traditional concerns pertaining to possible abuses arising

from bank

securities activities

with the reality that banking organizations have to improve their competitive equality in
the rapid-changing financial markets.

206

Moreover, the new Operating Standards would

reduce cumbersome compliance burdens on bank holding companies to engage in
investment banking businesses. Therefore, bank holding companies would be able to
increase their competitiveness and provide one-stop financial services at lower costs.

These substantial revisions

to

section 20 rules

would

also

facilitate

acquisitions of

investment banks and securities firms by bank holding companies.
D. Acquisitions of Investment banks by Bank Holding Companies

The Federal Reserve Board's
restricted

Fed

bank holding companies

affiliation

Votes to Replace Section 20 Firewalls with

204

Id.
205

significant revisions to the regulatory regime that

See Rodelli, supra note 141,

206

Id. at

343.

at

31 1-12.

with investment banks has

New Standards,

16 No. 17 Banking

made

it

PoFy Rep.

possible

5 (1997).
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for

bank holding companies

907

to acquire securities firms directly.

Reserve Board has increased the revenue limitation on ineligible

25%, and most investment
securities are close to or

firms' revenues

even

less than

Because the Federal

activities

from 10%

from underwriting and dealing bank-ineligible

25%,

it

is

feasible for

bank holding companies

acquire securities firms without reducing their ineligible securities activities.

Federal Reserve Board adopted
acquisitions
acquisitions

its

new

operating standards, a

by bank holding companies have taken
is

the Nationsbank acquiring

to

Montgomery

lot

After the

of investment bank

One of

place.

to

the

major

Securities.

Nationsbank Corporation, a bank holding company, sought approval from the
Federal Reserve Board to acquire
in

Montgomery

Securities,

which

is

principally involved

various investment banking businesses, such as underwriting and dealing in

debt and equity securities, government obligations, and

money market

all

types of

instruments,

providing financial and investment advisory services, and offering securities brokerage,
private placement,

and other financial services^

In

November, 1997,

the Federal
?

Reserve Board (Board) issued
successful merger, the

accessing a

207

much

See Meyerson

208

Id. at

its

1

1

order of approval of this acquisition.

After the

newly acquired section 20 subsidiary can take advantage of

stronger capital that

& Anderson, supra

would support

its

future growth in securitized

note 138, at 388.

390.

09

Id. Also see Mergers & Acquisitions: The Dealmakers Journal, January 1, 2000. Available at Westlaw,
2000 WL 10177440. From 1997 to 1999, major acquisitions of investment banks by bank holding
companies include:
(1) Bankers Trust New York Corp. acquired Alex. Brown Inc. (Baltimore).
(2) Fleet Financial Group Inc. acquired Quick & Reilly Group Inc. (New York).
(3) Chase Manhattan Corp. acquired Hambrecht & Quist Group (San Francisco).
(4) BankAmerica Corp. acquired Montgomery Securities (San Francisco).
(5) First Union Corp. acquired EVEREN Capital Corp. (Chicargo).
(6) US Bancorp acquired Piper Jaffray Cos. (St. Paul).

KeyCorp acquired McDonald & Co. Investments Inc.
Union Corp. acquired Wheat First Butcher & Singer (Richmond).
BankAmerica
Corp. acquired Robertson Stephens & Co. (San Francisco)
(9)
10)PNC Bank Corp. aquired Hilliard-Lyons Inc. (Louisville).
210
Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, Nationsbank Corporation,
(7)

(8) First

(

North Carolina, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 924, 924 (1997).
211

Id.

Charlotte,

38

212"

transactions."

NationsBank (now known as Bank of America) can provide a broader

range of financial services through the

By

new

section 20 subsidiary.

acquiring investment banks as their section 20 subsidiaries, bank holding

companies can immediately offer existing customers a broader range of
products.

214

Acquisitions of investment banks would give the acquiring bank holding

company immediate
businesses.

215

When

access

stronger

transactions.

access to various resources accumulated by investment banking

Investment banks also have incentives to merge with bank holding

companies.
to

financial

216

acquired by bank holding companies, investment banks will be able to

bases

capital

enable

that

them

to

conduct

larger

securitized

In addition, the acquired securities firms gain access to existing corporate

customers."

Although significant changes on administrative and agency rulings have made

much more

feasible

bank holding companies

for

previous existing restrictions
acquisitions and mergers.
affiliation restrictions

still

218

to

it

acquire investment banks, the

constrained the structuring and consummation of these

However, the Financial Service Act of 1999 repealed the

under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding

so that commercial banks, securities firms and insurance companies

each other as financial conglomerates.

219

Thus, the

new

may

Company Act
affiliate

with

legislation finally ratified the

formation of Citigroup, the combination of Citicorp and the Travelers Group, which had
contained

nonconforming

businesses

under

the

Bank Holding Company

Act."

Citicorp/Travelers merger has been considered as one of the necessary catalysts that

212

See Rodelli, supra note 141,

at 31

1.

213

Id.
214

See Meyerson

& Anderson, supra note

215

Id.
216

Id.
217

Id. at

392-93.

Id. at

397.

218

219

Merger

220

Id.

& Acquisitions, supra

note 209.

138, at 392.

39

urged Congress to pass the financial modernization reform

among

bills

and allow

affiliations

banks, insurance companies, and securities firms.

consummate

order to

In

Reserve Board

in

May.

N )S
L

the

for a

company would

chartered holding

merger with Citicorp. Travelers applied

to the

new bank holding company charter and then
acquire

all

voting shares of Citicorp and

all

Federal

the

newly

of ticorp's

subsidiaries.""" After carefully considering all information related to this transaction,

and

reviewing testimonies ol interested members of public, the Federal Reserve Board
granted conditional permission for the formation of Citigroup."""' The new bank holding

company had
banking

terminate or divest certain activities that were not permissible for

to

holding

insurance,

companies.""

financial

advisory

The major

internationally.

was

Travelers

and

other

extensively

financial

services

issue in the Citicorp Traveler's

formed holding company would be extensively involved

would be

illegal

five years to wait until

o(

all

It

its

unacceptable businesses

in

"'

new

newly

two years and then grant

as

Thus. Citicorp had up

to

its

Congress completed financial services reform

nonconforming

activities.

could divest

its

legislation, while

During the grace period,
to

if

the financial

consider several

insurance underwriting businesses, give up

charter, or incorporate in a foreign country.""
for the

that the

and

insurance businesses, which

modernization legislation were not passed. Citigoup would have
alternatives.

securities,

domestically

merger was

as three one-year extensions to the divestiture period.""

keeping

both

in

under the previous regulatory framework. The Federal Reserve Board

ordered Citigroup to divest

many

in

involved

But

all

its

banking

of these alternatives are not optimal

financial group to be prosperous in the future. Fortunately, the Financial

Cox. The Impact of the Citicorp-Travelers Group Merger on Financial Woderization ami
Nova L. Re\ 899, 922 1999).
" Id. Also see Bradley K. Sabel. The Citicorp Travelers Merger and The Bank Holding Company Act,
1091 PLI Corp 71, 81 (1998).
See Laura

J.

the Repeal ofGIass-Steagall, 23

::;
'

"'

226

hi. at

136-38.

See Sabel, supra note 222.

12U.S.C.

§1

843(cX6>

at S2.

(

40

Service Act of 1999 was signed into law by the U.S. president in

Citigroup

was

able to keep

all its

financial services without

November

worrying about

1999,

and

restrictions

on

bank-ineligible activities.

See Cox, supra note 221, at 923-25.
See Geoffrey M. Connor, The Financial Services Act of 1 999 -The Gramm-Leach-Blilev Act, 71 Pa. B.A.
Q. 29, 29 (2000).
""

CHAPTER V
RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORM
International and domestic financial markets have experienced dramatic changes.

Banking organizations have made many

efforts to

both domestic and international markets.
activities

As

part

expand

their business opportunities in

of the expanded businesses, securities

conducted by commercial banks, bank holding companies, and their

have increased significantly, especially

in

recent two decades.

affiliates

However, under the

previous regulatory framework, banks and bank holding companies have met
obstructions
organizations,

when

trying

keep

to

their

share

of

financial

Non-bank

such as securities and insurance firms have invaded into traditional

banking businesses. In addition, foreign bank
have competed with U.S. banks almost

arguments contending

that

in

any

institutions,

such as E.U. universal banks

area. Accordingly, there

institutions

have been a

under the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding

regime, American banks have lost their competitive advantages

non-bank

markets.

many

and foreign banks. In response

lot

of

Company Act

when competing with

to these changes,

Congress has

considered reforming the Glass-Steagall Act over the past two decades.
History of Recent Legislative Reform

A.

Early in 1980, the Congress considered reforming financial service regulations.
In nearly

twenty years, eight of the two-year Congresses have considered major financial

services

reform legislation.

progress, they have

all

Although these endeavors made varying degrees of

failed to finalize

mainly because the major players

229

new

legislation.

in the three industries,

John C. Dugan, Update on Modernization Legislation, 11

230

Id.

41

Wash

These reform

efforts failed

commercial banking, investment

U. L.Q. 521, 521 (1999).

42

When commercial

banking, and insurance, would not compromise their interests.

banks wanted

to

expand

their

powers

into the securities industry

Steagall restrictions, they encountered intense resistance

by

and

tried to repeal Glass-

the securities industry,

did not favor increased competition from commercial banks. Facing the

among

it

23

When

is difficult to

financial agencies

Congress has

favor one

Although Congress

at the

failed

to

balance the interests of the competing

expense of another.
reach the final reform legislation in

to

have been very aggressive

in

and investment banking industry. As discussed

commercial banking and the

securities

innovations and development of
financial market,

securities

The

OCC

to

engage

affiliates
234

activities.

These

in

to separate traditional

banking

previous Chapters, the lines between

industry

has

been blurred by technology

financial products. Facing the rapidly changing

banking regulators had a

securities activities.

banks and their

new

1998, the

dismantling some of the barriers imposed

by Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act

bank

battles

these industries, Congress lacked the political will to pass major financial services

reform legislation.
groups,

vehement

which

lot

of incentives to break

down

restrictions

have reinterpreted banking regulations
in

activities

on

to permit

wide variety of formerly bank-ineligible

a

include brokerage,

own-account investment,
-1

mutual funds, and underwriting and dealing

The Federal Reserve Board has
bank holding companies
firms.

236

The

limits

to

interpreted Section

acquire

-)

•

231

full

on revenue from bank

10%, and then increased

See Smoot, supra note 182,

to

at

in corporate debt

25%."

T

and equity

20 of the Glass-Steagall Act

to allow

service securities underwriting and dealing
ineligible activities

was

started at

5%, moved

-7

After the Federal Reserve Board adopted the

new

661.

232

Id.

Dugan, supra note 229,

at 522.

Significant Legislative Developments Affecting the

1105PLI/Corp 13,59(1999).
235

See Eaton, supra note 98, at 1 196-99.
See Dugan, supra note 229, at 522.

Meyerson

& Anderson, supra note

TC

securities.

138, at 388.

Work of the

Securities

and Exchange Commission,

43

operating standards for section 20 subsidiaries, there has been a stream of acquisitions of
securities firms

taken place

the regulatory level. But there

at

by Congress.

It

affiliations

was believed

among

several

Congress.

240

a need to pass formal statutory reform

merger could be one of the

modernization legislation and allow

to pass financial

banks, securities firms and insurance companies.

The 105th Congress made
1997,

is still

financial services reform has actually

that the Citicorp/Travelers

would urge Congress

catalysts that

The

by bank holding companies.

legislative

significant efforts

proposals

on Glass-Steagall reform.

In early

on the subject of reform were introduced

The Treasury Department released

a

in

comprehensive financial service

modernization proposal, as a legislative proposal, to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.

These

legislative

proposals,

introduced

organizations and their affiliates to engage

merchant banking

activities; (2)

agency

242

activities."

activities;

the

in

in:

and

form

of

bills,

banking

authorized

"(1) securities underwriting

(3) insurance underwriting,

and dealing

brokerage and

The House Banking Committee has held extensive hearings

regarding the issues associated with the expansion of banking powers and related
functional regulation.

243

The Banking and Commerce Committees passed

the range of financial activities that can be conducted
subsidiaries and affiliates.

own

238

Id. at

240

by bank

expand

by banking organizations and

In addition, these financial

securities firms either directly

subsidiaries.

39

244

bills to

reform

bills

their

authorized banks to

subsidiaries or though holding

company

45

390.

See Cox, supra note 221, at 921-22.
Recent Legislative Developments Affecting the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1037

PLI/Corp469,481 (1998).
241

242

Mat 492-93.
See Mattingly
For

details

& Fallon, supra note 83,

at 38.

about the House Banking Committee hearings, please see Recent Legislative Developments,

supra note 240, at 481-92.
245

See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 83, at 37-38.
Recent Legislative Development, supra note 240,

at

490.

44

To some
making

bank

certain

securities laws.

246

securities activities subject to the

Consumer

many customers buy
47

securities activities.

financial

have considered the necessity of

extent, these financial reform bills

SEC

regulations under the federal

protection issues are also considered in these bills, because

from banks and might be affected by bank

financial products

Although related committees have achieved some progress

in

law reform, the problems of previously existing regulatory regime were not

totally resolved

Congress

because of the differences between those

make

to

bills.

There was a need for

further legislative progress to balance relevant interests

between

banking and securities industries.

The 106th Congress

known

as H.R. 10 in the

have agreed

finally passed

House and S.900

new

to cooperate in this

the financial services reform legislation,

Congress and the White House

in the Senate.

On November

legislation.

12,

1999, President

Clinton signed into law the Financial Services Act of 1999, also called Gramm-LeachBliley Act,

249

representing the successful result of the most important financial reform in

recent years. This legislation repeals parts of the Glass-Steagall Act and the

Holding Company Act, which have prohibited
and insurance companies.
Financial Holding

Company.

affiliations

This act creates a
251

among

banks, securities firms,

new form of holding company

commercial banking, insurance, and

such financial

246

regulation."

the

securities activities.

5!

The

activities", including

Financial Services Act

embraces the functional regulation model within which bank securities

SEC

—

Financial holding companies are authorized to engage

activities that are "financial in nature or incidental to

subject to

Bank

As

result,

it

activities are

would eliminate bank exemptions from

the

Mat 481.

247

Id.
48

4

Steve Judge, Reform Bill to Bring Financial Services Rules

Connor, supra note 228,

at 29.

250

Id.
251

H.R.

10,

106th Cong. §103 (1999)

252

Id.

Recent Legislative Developments, supra note 240,

at

482.

Up

to

Date,

10/29/99

Am. Banker

6 (1999)

45

broker-dealer provisions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

254

The Act would

also eliminate the exclusion of banks from the definition of investment advisors under the

Company Act and

Investment

new law

unusually complex

is

the Investment Advisers

a compromise

among

Act of 1940.

of the turf war among different financial regulators,

companies

will be able to take advantage

their

powers.

holding

financial

legislation to significantly

expand

believed that this financial modernization legislation will give financial

unprecedented opportunities

institutions

B.

It is

new

Although the

various financial industries and a

settlement

of the

55

Summary of Expanded

in future

growth.

256

Financial Powers of Banks in the

New

Legislation

(S.900/H.R. 10)

The purpose of the Financial Services Act of 1999
framework

that

enhances competition

is

to create a prudential

in the financial service industry,

while allowing the

affiliation

of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial services

providers.

This legislation advocates a functional framework, in which securities

of financial holding companies are regulated by SEC, and banking

activities

activities are

subject to banking agency regulations.

There are seven

banking

titles

in

H.R.

institutions, securities firms

10.

some insurance

I

seeks to facilitate affiliation

and insurance companies.

functional regulation be the regulatory
Title III addresses

Title

framework

regulatory issues.

unitary saving and loan holding companies.

262

Title

25
'

Title

II

among

provides that

for financial holding companies.
261

Title

V

IV provides provisions

addresses privacy issues.

263

Title

Significant Legislative Developments, supra note 234, at 59.
255

Mat 61-60.
David Berson,

City Bus.
257

H.R.

258

Id.

J.

(Mo.)

Id. Title

I

Id. Title II

261

Id. Title III
262

Id. Title

IV

Id. Title

V

263

12, available at

106th Cong. (1999)

10,

§111

259
260

New Law Brings Growth

Opportunities to Banks

Westlaw, 1999

WL 24297993.

(Gramm- Leach

for

Act), 12/3/99 Kansas

46

VI discusses

the modernization of federal

other reform issues, such as

improvements.

which

265

ATM

fees,

Both the Senate and House

The new

legislation repeals section

from

banks

prevented

article, this part

on bank

bills

new
to

Company

in

new

focuses on Title

with

firms

It

also

principally

amends

that authorizes

that operate

section 4 of the
It

companies

to

establishes a

bank holding companies

in

is

qualified as a financial holding

engage

company, a bank holding company must meet

Id. Title

VI

Id. Title

VII

265

management

271

Bank Holding Company Act permits

and incidental
to

to

such financial

engage

in

Reserve Board has determined
activities.

activities

that

the

Board determines

§101
267
12 U.S.C. §24(1994)
" 0S
H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §102(1999)
69
Senate Bank Committee, Statement of Managers Summary of Major Provisions, S.900/H.R.
Conference Report, 1 156 PLI/Corp 1007, 1011-12 (1999)
H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §103 (1999)
Id.
212

Id.
273

Id.

to

be

Qualified bank holding

Id.

271

Foreign

financial holding

266

270

certain

standards.

in activities that the Federal

companies are also allowed

264

To be

company.

branches or control financial companies in the United States are

section 4 of the

financial in nature

Bank

However, a bank holding company may not engage

subject to comparable capital and

New

which

securities

in

requirements relating to capitalization, management, and community needs.

banks

266

as

it

eligible as a financial holding

II,

bank holding companies are qualified

financial activities, if the

financial activities, unless

and Title

at facilitating financial affiliations.

engaged

267

Bank Holding Company Act

269

I

20 and section 32 of the Glass Steagall Act,

affiliating

financial holding companies.

new

Title VII discusses

Act, eliminating nonbanking activity restrictions.

section 4 of the

engage

6

securities activities.

were aimed

underwriting, and restricted personnel overlaps.

Holding

loan bank system.

community Reinvestment, and other regulatory

For the purpose of the

are closely related to regulations

home

10,

are

47

complementary

impose a substantial

risk to the safety

774.

system."

It

is

a significant expansion

"closely related to banking"

H.R. 10 contains a
J

be financial

Board determines not

to financial activities, or other activities that the

in nature.

is

list

The

changed

and soundness of the bank and the financial
of bank financial powers when the standard of

to "financial in nature".

of specifically authorized

list

mutual funds, and other financial

275

activities that are considered to

includes securities underwriting, dealing, insurance, and
activities.

A

company may engage

financial holing

the listed activities without seeking prior permission

from the Federal Reserve Board.

But the company must give the Federal Reserve Board a notice within 30 days
77Q

begins the activity."

If a

bank holding company seeks approval

activity that is not listed in Section 4, the Federal

it

determines that the

has the

authority

activity

is

determine whether a

to

Statement of Managers, supra note 269,

to

Reserve Board

new

activity

is

in
978

after

it

conduct an additional

may

issue permission if

The Federal Reserve Board

financial in nature.

However, the Board's discretion

incidental.

274

new

to

is

nature

or

Before reaching

its

financial

not absolute.

in

at 101 1-12.

275
/</.

76

H.R.

10,

106th Cong. §103(1999). Activities considered financial in nature, in which

FHCs

will be able

to engage, include:
1.

Lending, Exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding

2.

Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm,

damage,

money

or securities.

illness, disability, or death, or

providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker for purposes of the foregoing.
3.

Providing financial, investment, or economic advisory services, including advising an investment

company.
4.

Issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools of assets permissible for a bank to hold
directly.
in, or making a market in securities.
any activity that the Board has determined, by order or regulation that is in effect on the
date of enactment of the Financial Services Act of 1999, to be so closely related...
Engaging, in the United States, in any activity that
a bank holding company may engage in outside the United States; and
ii. the Board has determined., to be usual in connection with the transaction of banking or other financial

5.

Underwriting, dealing

6.

Engaging

7.

in

i.

operations abroad.
8.

Directly or indirectly acquiring or controlling [a

pursuant to

this section.

.

271

Id.
78

Statement of Managers, supra note 269,

279

Id.

™ld.
281

Id.

at

1012.

company] engaged

in

any

activity not authorized

48

decision, the Federal Reserve

Board must consult with the Secretary of the Treasury

concerning applications or requests to engage in

new

28

activities.

The Secretary of

the

Treasury has the ultimate authority to approve the Federal Reserve Board's determination
TO!

new

on

activities."

The

consultative

process

is

designed

eliminate

to

arbitrary

determinations and achieve efficient regulation.

Before the financial modernization

bills

were signed

into law, the Federal

Reserve

and the Treasury Department had vehement debates over whether operating subsidiaries
of banks should be allowed

to

engage

in activities that are financial in nature.

Federal Reserve insisted that financial activities should be conduct
affiliates instead

of bank subsidiaries, the

OCC

would be more

legislation.

In the enacted

the

Gramm-Leach

OCC

activities that are authorized for financial

activity limitations

on

operating subsidiaries, because

to

made

engage

holding companies.

financial subsidiaries.

financial subsidiaries are prohibited

finally

a

compromise

to

in the

Act, financial subsidiaries of national

banks (previously operating subsidiaries) are able

some

its

and would not expose the deposit insurance fund

The Federal Reserve and

additional risks.

new

efficient

by holding company

argued that national banks should be

allowed to be involved in financial activities through
this

While the

in financial or incidental

However, there

are

still

Under the Gramm-Leach Act, bank

from some financial

activities that are permissible for

bank holding companies, such as insurance or tax-deferred annuities,

real

estate

development and investment, and merchant banking and insurance company portfolio
investments.

286

Securities activities of

bank

financial subsidiaries also will not encounter

legal constraints.

282

Id.
2 *3

Id.
284

Lee Meyerson

285

Id. at

982.

& Gary Rice,

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 1156 PLI/Corp 961, 981 (1999).

49

Functional Regulation

C.

H.R. 10 advocates a functional regulatory regime, within which banking
are regulated

by bank

authorities.

The

regulators,

and securities

by

activities are regulated

rational of functional regulation is to take

activities

securities

advantage of different types
TOO

of expertise particular financial agencies developed
It

would be

and practical

efficient

appropriate regulators.

department.

regulation
290

delegate

supervising different activities.

supervisory

certain

The Federal Reserve Board would be

financial holding companies.

functional

to

in

by

283

the

authorities

the umbrella supervisor of

Commercial banking businesses would be subject

OCC,

the

FDIC,

Securities and insurance activities

OTS

or

to

submit reports pertaining to

its

state-banking

would be regulated by

the Securities

require a bank holding

financial

condition,

transactions with depository institution subsidiaries, and

Holding
enforce."

Company Act and
The Board has

subsidiaries.

29

294

the authority to

the examination

is

to the safety

it

is

Id.
Id.
292

Id.
293

Id.

management systems,

risk

compliance with the Bank

limited

when

it

their

examines functionally

a functionally regulated subsidiary

affiliated depository institution, (2)

not in compliance with related regulations that the Board has

H.R. 10 106th Cong. §111 (1999)
Statement of Managers, supra note 269,
H.R. 1 1 06th Cong. §111(1 999)

291

is

and soundness of the

Id.

290

subsidiary

believes that (1) the subsidiary's activities would

286

289

its

necessary to give adequate information about systems of controlling

risks or, (3) the subsidiary

87

or

examine bank holding companies and

The Board may not examine

of a bank holding company unless
pose a material risk

its

company

.

other federal laws that the Board has specific jurisdictions to

However, the Board's authority

regulated subsidiaries.

to

related

a

and Exchange Commission, and relevant State securities and insurance authorities

The Federal Reserve Board may

to

at

1015.

50

jurisdiction to enforce.

subsidiary,

29
'

Before the Board takes actions against a functionally regulated

must review relevant reports

it

prepared for functional regulators.
affiliated

depository institution
7

activities.

296

is

Then,

must have reasonable cause

In order to protect the overall safety
to

an

and soundness of the financial system,

impose prudential safeguards on transactions
*)QO

and relationships between a depository

to believe

of the subsidiary's

facing material risk because

banking agencies are authorized

federal

it

holding company has

financial

the

that

institution

and

its affiliates."

The

OCC

and the

Federal Reserve Board are required to review the restrictions and requirements they

adopted to avoid significant risks
there

to the safety

and soundness of financial system.

If

not a continuing need for these prudential safeguards, the banking regulators

is

should modify such requirements or restrictions to eliminate unnecessary regulatory
burdens.

300

Title

II

of the Financial Services Act provides major provisions of functional

regulation of bank securities activities. H.R. 10
the

federal

activities are

securities

laws with respect to broker-dealer

conducted within the bank

dealers with the

SEC.

would eliminate bank exemptions from

302

itself,

the

If securities activities are

must be a registered broker-dealer subject

to

301

activities.

bank should

register as brokers

conducted by an

SEC

regulation.

If securities

3

and

affiliate, this affiliate
3

However, there are

limited exceptions that banks do not have to register as brokers and dealers for certain
securities activities.

304

These

activities include traditional

commercial paper and exempted

securities, third-party

294

Id.
295

Id.
296

Id.
291

Id.
298

Id.

§114

299

Id.
i00

Id.

Significant Legislative Developments, supra note 234, at 59.
302

Id. at
303
304

59-60.

At 60.
H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §201 (1999).

Id.

banking businesses such as

networking arrangements,

trust

51

activities, certain stock

purchase plans such as employee and shareholder benefit plans,

dividend reinvestment plans, and issuer plans, sweep accounts,
private

securities

and

safekeeping

offerings,

305

products, and municipal activities.

custody

affiliate transactions,

services,

identified

banking

H.R. 10 adds a new subsection about new hybrid

products of Section 15 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

306

A new hybrid product may

not be one of the products that banks can sell without registering as brokers and dealers

with the SEC. However, the

SEC

is

307

required to act by rulemaking before

regulates any

it

a rulemaking process, the

SEC

has to consult with the Federal Reserve Board about the registration requirement.

In

bank

sales

of these new products.

the rulemaking process, the
is

a

new

hybrid product.

309

SEC

Prior to

commencing

needs to prove that the

In addition, the

SEC

new product

is

it

has to whether imposing the registration

requirement will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

By amending

a security and

310

Company

the Investment Advisors Act and Investment

Act, H.R. 10

eliminates the bank exemptions from the definition of investment advisors with respect to

investment advisory

company

itself

311

activities.

Under

the

new

legislation, if a

bank or a bank holding

advises a registered investment company, this bank or holding

included in the term of investment advisers.
services to investment companies

by "a

312

If a

company

is

bank provides investment advisory

registered separately identifiable department or

division", this department or division should be registered as an investment adviser under

the

Investment

Advisers

Act.

313

However,

bank

trust

departments

may

provide

investment advisory services to private individuals without registering with the SEC.

35

For detailed description of exceptions, please see H.R.

306

Id.

10,

106th Cong. §201

§205

307

Id.
308

Statement of Managers, supra note 269,

at 1021.

309

Id.

M0

Id.

i]]

Id. at
312

1022.

H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §217 (1999)

3,3

Id.

Significant Legislative Developments, supra note 234, at 60-61.

52

By
legislation

delegating regulatory obligations to different financial regulators, the
intends

financial activities

model

in the

new

to

effectively

supervise

and control

the

increasingly

new

expanded

of financial conglomerates. To some degree, the functional regulatory
legislation achieves regulatory efficiency

by eliminating regulatory

gaps that might risk effective supervision. However, the assumption that various financial
agencies would cooperate each other in a perfect way, which
functional regulation,

is

not fully justified.

To

is

a

key

factor of successful

efficiently protect the safety

of financial system, the new legislation should be carefully designed.

and soundness

CHAPTER VI
APPROPRIATE REGULATORY REGIME FOR

MODERN BUSINESS OF BANKING
modernized regulatory regime provided by the Financial Services Act of

In the

1999, financial holding companies are allowed to provide a

commercial

including

services,

15

businesses.

banking,

Banking organizations

are

investment

full

range of financial

banking,

and

insurance

no longer prohibited from investment banking

businesses such as securities underwriting and selling, brokerage, investment advising,

and underwriting and selling financially-related products. In sum, the current financial
services reform have successfully
there are

some

issues that

expanded and diversified banking powers. However,

need careful

attention.

A. Corporate Structure

very

is

It

organizations

who

important

to

choose

the

right

corporate

are experiencing significant expansion

structure

for

banking

and transformation. Generally,

there are three major corporate structures for integrating traditional banking and securities
activities

bank.

—

company, and the operating subsidiaries of the

the universal bank, the holding

316

In

universal

banks,

commercial

banking,

investment

nontraditional banking activities are conducted within the
to

separate

register
1

•

businesses.

1

subsidiaries

or

affiliates

to

bank

provide

banking,

itself.

and

There

is

other

no need

non-commercial banking

Q

In this corporate structure,

banks

may

take advantage of efficiencies that

315

H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §103 (1999).
See Bernard Shaull & Laurence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for Expanded Bank
115 Banking L.J. 446, 446 (1998).

317

Mat 467.

318

Id. at

470.

53

Activities,

54

are raised from sharing of joint facilities, personnel,

corporate resources.

31

These efficiencies would reduce costs

'

However, banks may be subject
affect the

knowledge, brand name, and other

solvency of the bank.

For corporations

who

to greater risks that failures

in the

of new

bank's businesses.

activities will directly

320

are trying to obtain funds in the public capital market

through universal banks, there are more risks associated with dealing with these
entities.

"

These

of the banks to promote securities they

risks include: "the inclination

underwrite; pressure a corporation to use

its

underwriting capabilities by threatening to

discontinue a line of credit; or the tendency to force borrowers in financial difficulties to

pay off loans".

issue risky securities to

The universal banking model

prevails in the

Germany. The European Union has a more

liberal

European Union, especially

approach

in

to corporate structure issues

than the United States does. The European Union allows their banking institutions to

choose

their corporate

universal banking
in a liberal

structure,

model."

It is

while the Second Banking Directive promotes the

believed in the European Union that the universal banks

banking system have the greatest competitive advantages.

European Union and the United States are trying
banking organizations

more concerns on

in the global

to

324

While both the

enhance the competitiveness of

their

market, banking regulators in the United States have

the safety and soundness of

its

financial system. Therefore,

banking

agencies in the U.S. have continually used firewalls to separate different financial
activities

319

by

either a holding

company

structure or an operating subsidiary model.

Mat 463.

320

Id. at

470.

Study supports commercial banks

to engage in securities activities, supra note 8 1
Id
Joao A. Santos, Commercial Banks in the Securities Business: A Review (Bank for
Monetary and Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 56, 1998).

322

-

324

Id.

Int*l

Settlements.

55

The
banks.

325

banking

OCC

Under

favors the operating-subsidiary structure for nontraditional activities
the

activities

new Operating

by

a

may conduct

Subsidiary rule, a bank

from the depository

subsidiary separated

effectiveness that a universal
directly affect the solvency

bank could enjoy, but losses

of the bank.

327

banks can enjoy more benefits relating
different businesses than holding

32

activities are

to

may

328

may

conduct certain nonbanking

company,

Bank Holding Company

it

capitalization, risk

companies have

is still

of one

affiliate will

is

not qualified

subject to a lot of activity restrictions under the

& White, supra note 316,
12C.F.R. §5.34(d)(1997)
Shaull & White, supra note 316,

3
'

In addition,

The holding company

at

473.

at

473.

be exposed

328

Id.

106th Cong. §103 (1999).

330

Id.
331

bank holding company

structure

to

bank holding

may

to

ensure that

not directly risk the financial holding company, thus the

affiliated deposit institution will not

10,

If a

and certification with the Federal Reserve Board

to file a declaration

failures

H.R.

Bank holding

activities that are financial in nature, if they

management, and community needs.

financial holding companies.

329

structure.

meet some statutory requirements pertaining

to

become

327

company

Act. In other words, in order to provide full financial services,

bank holding companies have

Shaull

securities

conducted by separated subsidiaries of a holding company. The Financial

as a financial holding

25

some

in the subsidiary will not

company model, commercial banking and

are qualified financial holding companies.

326

lose

smoothing of aggregate income flows from

Services Act of 1999 advocates the financial holding

companies

By

In addition, in the operating subsidiary model,

companies do.

financial holding

In the

investment

institution.

providing nontraditional services through a separate subsidiary, the bank

by

Statement of Managers, supra note 269,

at 1016.

to risky investments.

However, reducing

56

by

risks

between different

firewalls

may

affiliates

incur greater costs and decrease

332

profits.

argued that bank holding company structure

is

It

may

not be the best

way

to

organize financial services, since financial institutions are not likely to choose the holding

company

structure

if

OCC

subsidiary model, the

leeway
to

choose their

to

by

not required

own

maintains that

is

more convenient and

nonbank

activities in

to a greater extent.

is

is

company

no need

structure.

banks should be able

efficient

bank

to

and

conduct financial businesses and

banks

to organize their financial

There are some concerns

335
It is

holding company.

336

affiliate

of a holding company will cause

However, given the notion

its

capital to a subsidiary, conducting

more

that the

332
333

and

this

prompted a "turf

& White, supra note 316,

New American

335

Id. at
Id.
337

Id.

insists

battle"

at

nonbank

not invest or
activities in

and soundness of depository

on the financial holding companies

between the Federal Reserve Board and the

472.

SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 30,

336

may

actively

pertaining to whether financial activities should be conducted through holding

Shaull

The

risks to the safety

OCC

337

The Federal Reserve, however,

OCC,

allowing

believed that the failure of an operating subsidiary will directly

operating subsidiaries will not put

structure,

that

bank operating subsidiaries will endanger the deposit insurance fund

more than 10% of

institutions.

enjoy more

profitable. If operating a

monitors banks and their operating subsidiaries, and a national bank
lend

to

Market incentives would make banks

to force

impair the bank's capital, while the failure of an
less risk to the

334

most

efficient for a

create profits at lower costs, there

services in the holding

at least

corporate structure.

choose the form of organization that

subsidiary

While advocating the bank operating

law.

1322-23.

1323.

at

84-126.

Universal Bank, supra note 176,

at

1316.

57

companies

affiliate or

bank operating

subsidiaries.

338

A

compromise was

finally reached

Financial Services Act, under which banks that meet certain requirements on

in the

capitalization,

activities

banks.

339

management, and community reinvestment

either

will

through holding company subsidiaries or

Therefore, both the Federal Reserve Board and the

oversee banking activities.
flexibility to

be able

choose

340

Now

to

financial

OCC

engage

affiliate

subsidiaries

have the authority

U.S. banking organizations have

their cooperate structure to

conduct

of
to

some degree of

in activities that are financial in

nature.

Functional Regulatory

B.

Model

The Financial Services Act addresses a
federal

while

banking agencies regulate the banking

SEC

different

from the

securities laws

institutional or entity

by banking

by

the

Compared

by

merit.

SEC.

Under

of a bank holding company,

company.

341

This functional model

agencies, and securities firms are regulated under the

342

scheme, the functional approach has

different administrative agencies.

on which

it

Each agency would take responsibility

to regulate

has adequate knowledge and expertise, thus avoiding some

For example, since the

SEC

is

familiar with the securities business,

should be authorized to regulate bank securities activities that are not traditional

banking businesses. The new legislation also notices the complexity of
products such as

new

hybrid products. In order to regulate the

See Connor, supra note 228,

new hybrid

new

financial

products, the

at 29.

339

Id.
340

Id.
341

342

is

the functional regulatory regime, different businesses are supervised

inefficient regulation.

38

which

model, within which banks are regulated under

to the institutional regulatory

financial activities

it

activities

regulates the securities business of this

the banking laws

some

functional regulatory scheme, in

H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §111 (1999)
See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk not Function, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 441, 442-43 (1998).

58

SEC
is

has to go through a rulemaking process required by the

also required to consult with the Federal Reserve

have

to

The SEC

Board before commencing the

the securities regulator and banking agency to avoid arbitrary regulatory

To achieve

decisions.

343

legislation.

This complex process would combine the

rulemaking process to seek concurrence.

wisdom of both

new

the goal of effective regulation, securities and banking regulators

cooperate with each other on a

lot

of issues. To some degree, function regulation

could reduce regulatory burdens on federal banking agencies pertaining to non-bank
4~

subsidiaries.

The Federal Reserve Board
companies.

company

346

The Board has

is

the umbrella supervisor of

the authority to

all

examine reports of any

financial holding

financial holding

or subsidiary and to take enforcement action against such a holding

subsidiary for violation of law.

from other
authority

affiliates

To

capital

requirements

still

have the

on the bank holding company and
-J

subsidiaries to avoid the misuse of

or

protect a depository institution from risks arising

of the holding company, the federal banking agencies

impose

to

347

company

its

AQ

bank resources.

'

The Federal Reserve Board has

adopted capital adequacy guidelines that "require bank holding companies to maintain
adequate levels of capital on a consolidated basis",

349

holding companies operate without capital problems.

Board

may

at

10,

350

106th Cong. §205 (1999).

Id.
45

See Mattingly
H.R.

10,

& Fallon, supra

note 83, at 40.

106th Cong. §111 (1999).

347

Id.
348

See Mattingly

349

Id. at 39.
350

Id. at 41.

sure that bank

the umbrella supervisor, the

company

or an affiliate of a

In addition, in order to protect against the

344

346

make

an early stage, thus preventing serious problems from happening

to the depository institution.

H.R.

As

identify the problems of a financial holding

depository institution

343

in order to

& Fallon, supra note 83, at 40.

misuse of a

59

bank's

insured

transactions

deposits,

federal

between a deposit

banking

institution

and

agencies
its

have

non-bank

effectively

to

supervise

351

affiliates.

Proponents of functional regulation indicate that true functional regulation will
ensure competitive

equality,

regulatory

consumer protection measures.

Under

efficiency

and effectiveness, and adequate

the functional regulatory model, entities engaged

similar transactions and products are subject to

in

the

same

interpreted

rules

and

administered consistently by the same regulators, thus avoiding inconsistent application

of rules and regulations by different regulatory agencies.
functional

that functional regulation

public.

by ensuring

approach,

would

354

conflict,

Furthermore, proponents believe

protect and benifit customers in

all

areas of financial

the widest range of financial products at the lowest cost to the

functional

model would run

financial system, if there

new

legislation

financial agencies.

is,

356

is

efficiently to protect the safety

perfect cooperation

among

to a certain extent, a series

and soundness of

functional regulators. However,

of compromises reached by various

Both the Federal Reserve Board and the

primary regulator of the new financial conglomerates.
turf,

this

355

The

the

Under

would improve regulatory efficiency by "reducing

regulation

duplication, and overlap of the regulatory function".

services

35

"

OCC

In order to

fought to be the

keep

their regulatory

they have been arguing whether activities that are financial in nature should be

conducted

by

holding

company

consequence of the compromise

is to

subsidiaries

or

operating

subsidiaries.

"

The

delegate regulatory responsibilities of supervising

3

=; id.

L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept For Glass-Steagall Reform, 2 Stan. J. L. Bus.
90(1995).
Linda Birkin Tigges, Functional Regulation of Bank Insurance Activities: The Time Has come, 2 N.C.
Banking Inst. 455, 477 (1998).

See Melanie

Fin. 89,

354

Id. at

480.

Id. at

483.

355

356

See Connor, supra note 228,

357

Id.
358

Id.

at 29.

&

60

financial holding

companies among the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, the SEC, and

other federal and state financial regulatory agencies.

35

Although the new

authorizes the Federal Reserve Board as the umbrella regulator,

problems pertaining

to

inefficient

among

cooperation

It is

financial

lot

of

agencies,

360

argued that although functional regulation could solve some problems of the

institutional regulatory regime, the notion that regulation

businesses

cannot solve a

it

different

conflicting regulatory interpretations, and a lack of accountability.

legislation

or

products

flawed.

is

361

Functional

would be

regulation

clarifying various regulators' jurisdictional line. Clearly
potential confusion

should be separated based on

drawn

lines

by

effective

would eliminate

and conflict among different regulatory agencies. However,

it

is

almost impractical to cleanly separate one regulator's jurisdictions from others. Since the
line

between some financial services

increasingly interchangeable,

regulated

by bank

regulators,

it

is

not clear and

is difficult to

SEC, or other

financial agencies.

among

regulation cannot reduce

resulting

regulations

by

accommodate

changing

financial

362

Moreover, regulatory

from conflicting interpretations of

businesses.

model lacks

363
It

is

regulations should focus directly on the risks instead of the function.
to

are

various financial agencies. Functional

different agencies. In addition, the functional

rapidly

financial products

determine whether these services should be

concerns are not clearly distinguishable
inefficiencies

some

control the risks of financial business can

more

flexibility to

recommended
364

that

A system seeking

effectively cope with the rapid

changing financial environment, while protecting the safety and soundness of banking
system

359

360

in

an efficient manner.

365

H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §§111, 112, 114(1999)
Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House Banking and Fin. Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999). Testimony

of Ralph Nader.
361

See Schooner, supra note 342,

362

Id. at

476.

363

Id.

iM

Id.

365

Id. at

478.

at

475.

61

Consumer

C.

Protection

The modernization of
customers' activities since they

also greatly affect bank

the business of banking will

now

can purchase almost

all

kinds of financial products

within one "financial supermarket". The previous legal barriers between banking and
securities activities has, to

from involvement

some

degree, effectively protected bank customers' deposits

in risky investments, thus insuring the safety

and soundness of the

banking system. Now, as cross-industry restrictions within the previous regulatory regime
are

dismantled,

protection

of consumer rights becomes

a

serious

concern

in

the

increasingly complex financial markets.

When

H.R. 10 was originally introduced by the House Banking and Financial

Services Committee and

House Commerce Committee,

provided adequate consumer protection.
concerns of consumer protection.
services at comparatively

low

One
368

costs.

is

it

did not contain provisions that

Consumer advocates addressed two major

how

The other

can consumers access reliable financial
is

how

to adequately protect

consumers'

privacy in the increasingly sophisticated financial markets associated with increased
cross-industry affiliations.

Consumer advocates worry

that despite the convenience, the one-stop

shopping

when

they are

provided by financial conglomerates will increase customers' costs

consuming

may

financial services.

370

They

are

concerned that improperly trained personnel

abuse customers' reliance on banking services, aggressively persuading customers to
a*7

purchase unfamiliar financial products that might bear too

many

risks.

Consumer

advocates also fear that the concentration of business powers within one financial

66
367
368

See Helen A. Garten, The Consumer ization of Financial Regulation, 11 Wash. U. L.Q. 287, 287 (1999).
H.R. 10, 105th Cong. (1998).
Hearings: Testimony of Edmund Mierzwinski. Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader. 106th Cong

(1999).
359

Hearings: Testimony of Ralph Nader. 106th Cong. (1999)

Susan Sirota Gaetano, An Overview of Financial Services Reform 1998, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 793 (1998).
Really Want to be Owned by a Citicorp "Big Brother? " Retail Banker Int'l, Apr. 29,
1998, available at 1998 WL 10785482.
'

Do Consumers

62

conglomerate would weaken a customer's

when

ability to negotiate

accepting services.

37

Therefore, if financial providers charge higher fees, consumers have to accept whatever
the financial conglomerates might offer.

Consumer advocates

additionally

worry about potential

abuses

conglomerates regarding confidential information of their customers.
predicted that a bank holding

customers from
resources.

374

its

company would combine

by

financial

It

could be

37

the private information about

various affiliates, in order to take advantage of unified information

Since the current privacy regulations are not very stringent and do not place

burdens on companies to get permission from customers before sharing customers'

consumer advocates

fear that financial conglomerates

information without customers' consent.

to

disclose

its

might inappropriately use private

"interest" groups, the Financial Services

1999 includes provisions addressing privacy
institution

files,

375

Because of pressures from various

financial

its

issues. Title

V

Act of

of the Act requires every

privacy policy pertaining to sharing of private
77 f\

information with affiliates and with third parties.

Financial providers are required to

...

give customers a notice and an opportunity to "opt-out" of sharing their private records
777

and information with nonaffiliated third

imposed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act will be
law

may preempt

the sharing of nonpublic personal

information

providing customers "opt-out" notices.

72

Citigroup Starts

Damage

available at Westlaw, 1998
3

374

375

effective,

on information-sharing

and more

However, the new

among

Therefore,

affiliated

legislation allows

institutions

without

Consumer advocates' concerns on

Control on Consumer Complaints, Bank Marketing

WL

restrictive state

Int'l,

Aug.

1,

1998,

at

Westlaw,

12310670.

Gaetano, supra note 370.

Marcy Gordon, Financial Privacy

1998
376

still

77R

related regulations in the Act."

•

Restrictions

parties.

WL 6661958.

See Gaetano, supra not 370.
H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §501 (1999)

377

Id.
378

Id.
il9

Id.

§502

Bill

Pushed, Associated Press,

May

8,

1998, available

63

possible abuses pertaining to sharing of private records and information
the

new

still

exists under

regulatory regime.

International Regulatory Issues

D.

Another issue

is

how

to effectively supervise U.S.

subsidiaries in foreign countries.

It

is

more

banking organizations

that

have

and complicated for U.S. banking

difficult

agencies to effectively regulate and oversee activities of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
banks. Big failures of these subsidiaries

may

impact on the safety and soundness of their

parent banks in the United States, even though these affiliates are registered separately.

Therefore, besides the need for an appropriate regulatory framework in the United States
for

expanded banking powers,

it

is

also very important that banking activities should be

adequately supervised on the international

have increased the need

However, because of

for international supervisory

is

among

significant disparities

in different countries, effective control

easy. There

level. Financial globalization

a need for cooperation

and liberalization

convergence on banking regulation.

different

banking regulatory systems

of international banking businesses

among banking

by

from

far

agencies of different countries.

Furthermore, in order to avoid leaving supervisory gaps that might allow too
taking activities

is

much

risk-

international banks, both banking and securities regulators should

cooperate with each other in both domestic and international markets.

Although generally, the European Union have endeavored
services throughout European countries,

and soundness of

it

also pays considerable attention to the safety

credit institutions, especially

its

when

internationalized and deregulated in the global market.
are adequately supervised has

the First

to liberalize financial

become an important

380

universal banking

becomes

Whether or not universal banks

issue in the

Banking Directive, the host country should "establish

EC

since 1977.

capital

381

Under

and solvency

ratios

See generally, Lawrence L. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law, Strengthening International Banking
Supervision, 39 Va.

J.

Int'l L.

1

(1998).

Suzette Rodriguez, Are Banks within the European

&Comp.

L. Rev. 213,

222

(

1994).

Community Adequately Supervised?

17 B.C.

Int'l

64

382^

applicable to the banks to ensure prudential banking practices"."
States

should cooperate to

problems could

supervise

credit

institutions."

from the supervisory regime under the

result

Recognizing
First

The

state,

structure

The

their registered offices.

would be able

prevent

to

Member

Nevertheless, "host

potential

EU

financial

home

financial services regulatory
crises

Member

to

some

extent.

State for the supervision of the liquidity

the branches of credit institutions pending further coordination".

Consolidated

state

38

States shall retain responsibility in cooperation with the

competent authorities of the home

on

home

responsibility of supervising banking activities remained in the

where banks have

some

that

Banking Directive, the

Council adopted the Second Banking Directive, establishing the principle of
control."

Member

Moreover,

Supervision

required

horizontally-structured

38

of

The 1983 Directive

credit

institutions

to

100

combine

their financial status for supervising purposes.

the 1992 Directive

on Consolidated Supervision

Moreover, the Council adopted

to require consolidated supervision

of

TO A

vertically-structured
institutions, the

groups.

Instead

of imposing

The Council has

Thomas

States. In order to ensure that

F.

credit

390

391

However, the Council can not accomplish

goals to supervise international banks adequately without cooperation

Member

on

also provided guidelines for adequate supervision to ensure the

safety and soundness of credit institutions.

'

directly

1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision increases the responsibilities

of parent companies and supervising authorities.

its

obligations

Mcinerney

L.J. 143, 151 (1994).

III,

First

from the

banking institutions are acting on a safe and sound

Towards the Next Phase

in

International Banking Regulation, 7 DePaul Bus.

Council Directive 77/780/EEC, Art. 6(1).

363

Id.
384

Rodriguez, supra note 381,

at

222.

385

Also see Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC.
Barbara C. Matthews, The Second Banking Directive: Conflicts, Choices, and Long-term Goals, 2 Duke
J. Comp.&Int'l 89, 90(1992).
387
Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Art. 14.
Id.

at 222. See Also The 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision
Also see The 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision

Rodriguez, supra note 381,
Id.
390

Id.
i9]

Id.

65

basis,

it

Member

necessary for the

is

States to

implement these Directives properly

through their supervisory authorities.

Although there are a

lot

of arguments on the appropriate regulatory model for

banking businesses, clearly adequate supervision

Many

soundness of the banking system.

is

important to ensure the safety and

developed countries have preserved prudential

supervisions, such as requirements for capital adequacy, adequate liquidity, and internal
control systems, etc.
international

393

As modern banking becomes more

supervision

increasingly important.

is

internationalized, effective

Lessons from the

BCCI

scandal

suggest that financial crises might appear because of lacking supervision and control.
In addition, the failure
risks

can

result

transactions.

39

'

of Barings

and

PLC

gives an example of

consequence

the

of

how

inappropriate

non-traditional systemic

cross-border

Although these bank collapses were not simply the

extensive involvement in the securities business, they

may

394

result

derivative

of banks'

underscore the importance of

Expanded

domestic

and

diversified

banking business increases the need for effective cooperation of international

coordination

international

banking regulation.

396

of banking

While enlarging the international

supervision.

financial markets

and

and quickening

the pace of liberalization of the financial industry, regulatory authorities have to ensure

The Basle

the safety and soundness of domestic and international banking systems.

Committee on Banking Supervision and

Commissions (IOSCO) have endeavored

International

Organization

of Securities

to achieve international regulatory

convergence

TQO

The

on banking supervision.

overall purpose of the international supervision

is

to

protect the stability and integrity of banking system, thus ensuring the prosperity and

healthy development of international financial markets.

392

Id.
93

94

95
96

397

See Lee, supra not 380,

at 27.

Rodriguez, supra note 381,

at

213.

See Northon & Olive, supra note
See Lee, supra not 380, at 10.
Id. at 10-11.

15, at

239-41

The United

States,

European

66

Union, and major developed countries have adopted the Basle Accords. This clearly
reflects a

movement towards more coordinated

international financial system.

98

399

See Northon & Olive, supra note
See Lee, supra not 380, at 30.

15, at 228.

financial supervisory standards in the

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The
securities

financial modernization bills to overturn depression-era restrictions

and other cross-industry

activities

were

and signed into law as the Gramm-Leach Act

March of 2000,

which took effective

in

industry affiliations

by banks,

passed by the U.S. Congress,

November, 1999. The new

legislation,

places the final stamp of legitimacy on cross-

securities

holding companies are able to offer a

in

finally

on bank

full

and insurance companies. Financial

firms,

range of financial services.

cross-industry affiliations will take place, thus the

As

a result,

more

number of financial conglomerates

will

be increased. Subject to a liberalized regulatory regime, U.S. financial holding companies
will

be able

to effectively

compete with foreign banks, such

as

European universal banks,

in

both domestic and international marketplaces. In addition, bank customers will be able

to

enjoy greater convenience and lower prices as the result of one-stop shopping within

one financial supermarket.

The scope of

the future business of banking will be

much

broader than today,

considering the rapid development of new financial products and technology innovations.

Deregulation and removing restrictions on bank activities has
reality

become an

inevitable

of expanded financial markets. However, protecting the safety and soundness

also extremely necessary.

The Financial Services Act of 1999

is,

is

to a certain degree,

successful in reducing regulatory burdens on financial institutions, expanding banking

powers, and delegating supervisory responsibilities
are

some remaining

issues,

regarding

the

among

right

financial regulators. But there

corporate

structure

of financial

conglomerates, the appropriateness of a functional regulatory regime, and the proper

scope of consumer protection provisions. Resolving these issues would help to reduce

67

68

potential risks

how

in the diversified

achieve necessary cooperation

to

concern.
create

and abuses

To

effectively

and expanded financial market.

among

implement the new

excessive regulatory burdens,

and

at

In addition,

various financial regulators

is

still

of

legislation, financial agencies should not

the

same time should avoid

potential

regulatory gaps in the rapid-changing financial businesses.

The growth of

financial transactions in the international

market also raises some

problems. Inadequate supervision and control on international banks could result
potential financial crises. Therefore, cooperation
authorities

is

between national

increasingly necessary to prevent possible

disasters in the international

banking system. Since

interchangeable in the modern market,

it is

many

bank

financial supervisory

failures

and financial

financial services are highly

difficult to distinguish traditional

investment banking businesses. Accordingly, there

is

banking and

a need for cooperation between

banking agencies and other financial agencies such as securities regulators.
international

level,

for

On

the

example, the Basle Accords are intended to regulate other

financial industries beside

Securities

in

banking by cooperation with the International Organization of

Commissions and

the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.

Although diversified operations by banks both

in

400

domestic and international

markets do not materially increase the prospects of a financial

crisis,

safety and

soundness concerns remain legitimate. Effective coordination of international supervision
is

highly important, because of the increased complexity of the structure of the

international banking industry.
financial businesses, including

While allowing banks

to

engage

in the full

range of

commercial banking and investment banking businesses,

domestic regulators and international supervisors should cooperate

and soundness of financial system.

When

to

maintain the safety

trying to enhance the efficiency, profitability

and competitiveness of future banking industry, regulatory authorities should ensure

400

Id. at 6.

that

69

banking organizations are adequately supervised, both

in

domestic financial markets and

international markets.
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